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From Identification to Identity Theft: 
Public Perceptions of Biometric Privacy 
Harms 
Matthew B. Kugler* 
Central to understanding biometric privacy is the question of biometric privacy harms. How 
much do people value biometric privacy, and what evils should biometric privacy laws seek to avert? 
This Article addresses these questions by surveying two nationally representative samples to 
determine what does, and does not, worry people in the context of biometrics. The results show that 
many people are deeply concerned about biometric privacy in the consumer context, that they are 
willing to sacrifice real benefits to preserve biometric privacy, and that those who are concerned with 
biometric privacy attribute their concern to many factors that are not directly related to data security, 
particularly public tracking. Further, people’s level of comfort with biometric data collection differs 
sharply depending on the uses to which the data will be put and not just on the type of data collected. 
These nuanced attitudes about biometric privacy are in sharp conflict with a purely data security 
approach to biometric harms, and therefore have substantial implications both for future legislative 
consideration as well as current standing litigation. 
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Issues of biometric privacy have arisen with increasing frequency over the last 
several years as biometric scanners have become cheaper and more prevalent.1 
Though advocates have been sounding the alarm about biometric privacy for 
decades, by 2018 even Microsoft was calling for greater regulation of facial 
recognition technology.2 Along with this increased concern has come a wave of 
litigation against technology companies that use facial recognition to identify people 
in photographs and employers that use fingerprint biometric scanners for employee 
timekeeping.3 In the trenches of the Northern District of California, for example, 
Facebook is facing more than $30 billion in potential liability for violations of 
biometric privacy laws.4  
 
1. Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of Things,  
59 B.C. L. REV. 423, 435–37 (2018) (reviewing the increased use of biometrics across industries). 
2. Drew Harwell, Microsoft Calls for Regulation of Facial Recognition, Saying It’s Too Risky to Leave to 




alone/] (reporting company president Brad Smith’s statement: “This technology can catalog your 
photos, help reunite families or potentially be misused and abused by private companies and public 
authorities alike. The only way to regulate this broad use is for the government to do so.”). 
3. See, e.g., Steven Grimes & Eric Shinabarger, Biometric Privacy Litigation: The Next Class 
Action Battleground, BLOOMBERG LAW: BIG LAW BUS. ( Jan. 17, 2018), https:// 
biglawbusiness.com/biometric-privacy-litigation-the-next-class-action-battleground [https://
perma.cc/F4BU-VRGQ] (noting that over 60 class action lawsuits have been filed under BIPA since 
2015); Scott Holland, Judge: No ‘Risk of Harm’ to Rexnord Workers from Fingerprint Scan Time  
Clocks; Case Sent Back to Cook Courts, COOK COUNTY REC. ( July 20, 2018), 
https://cookcountyrecord.com/stories/511494676-judge-no-risk-of-harm-to-rexnord-workers- 
from-fingerprint-scan-time-clocks-case-sent-back-to-cook-courts [https://perma.cc/HZ2S-EHZV] 
(discussing lawsuit against Rexnord Industries for use of fingerprint-based timeclock system); Anna  
S. Knight & Patrick J. Castle, Employers Face a Rise in Biometric Privacy Suits, WORKFORCE (Feb. 7, 
2018), https://www.workforce.com/2018/02/07/employers-face-rise-biometric-privacy-lawsuits/ 
[https://perma.cc/6W8Z-LKA3] (suggesting that the “recent spate” of BIPA litigation is not an 
anomaly but indicative of more litigation to come).  
4. Class Action Complaint, Pezen v. Facebook, No. 1:15-cv-03484 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2015); 
Consol. Class Action Complaint, Licata v. Facebook, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-03747-JD (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 
2015); see also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15, 20 (2019). For damage figures, see calculations in Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz & Matthew B. Kugler, Is Privacy Policy Language Irrelevant to Consumers?, 45 J. LEGAL 
STUD. S69, S95 n.2 (2016). Thus far, Facebook has been unable to have the case dismissed at the district 
court level and the Ninth Circuit recently upheld class certification on interlocutory appeal. Patel  
v. Facebook, Inc., No. 18-15982, 2019 WL 3727424, at *7 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2019).  
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The Facebook litigation is only part of a wave of lawsuits filed under Illinois 
law against companies for the improper collection and use of biometric data. Some 
of these suits have been filed against major technology companies due to their 
helpful—perhaps too helpful—analysis of user-uploaded photos.5 More lawsuits 
have been filed against companies that use fingerprint readers and other biometrics 
to clock employees in and out during shift changes.6 Such biometric timekeeping 
technologies have been increasingly used in recent years as companies have sought 
to avoid the “buddy punch” problem of workers being marked as present by 
friends.7 In January of 2019, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a broad 
interpretation of its state privacy law, making it likely that such litigation will 
continue for the foreseeable future.8 
Despite this rash of attention to biometrics, we know precious little about how 
everyday people view uses of biometric technology and why they might value 
biometric privacy. Many courts have adopted the view that biometric privacy serves 
only to protect against identity theft.9 Under this limited perspective, it poses little 
problem when companies begin to collect large amounts of biometric data.10 These 
courts, therefore, see no harm and find no standing to sue.11 
But consider how three alternate rationales for protecting biometric privacy 
affect the harm analysis—the analysis which determines whether these lawsuits are 
even permitted in federal court. If one believes that the point of a biometric privacy 
law is to protect against identity theft, then one is not harmed by biometric data 
collection until the possibility of such theft has increased. This is a data security 
 
5. See, e.g., Rivera v. Google Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1090 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Norberg  
v. Shutterfly, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 
6. See, e.g., McGinnis v. United States Cold Storage, Inc., No. 17 C 08054, 2019 WL 95154, at 
*1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2019); Goings v. UGN, Inc., No. 17-CV-9340, 2018 WL 2966970, at *1  
(N.D. Ill. June 13, 2018); Howe v. Speedway LLC, No. 17-CV-07303, 2018 WL 2445541, at *1  
(N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018). 
7. See, e.g., Becky Yerak, Companies Sued Over Use of Biometric Data, CHI. TRIB., 
http://digitaledition.chicagotribune.com/tribune/article_popover.aspx?guid=25cf7766-b719-4140-
91d7-e0657dec6a36 [https://perma.cc/KK93-6EBZ] ( last visited Aug. 11, 2018) (reporting on 
lawsuits filed by employees contesting fingerprint-based timeclocks ); Eliminate Punching With our 
Biometric Solutions, TREERING (Mar. 25, 2018), https://treeringws.com/eliminate-buddy-punching-
with-our-biometric-solutions/ [https://perma.cc/V344-G377] (explaining biometric buddy  
punching solution); What Is Buddy Punching and How to Prevent It, TSHEETS, https:// 
www.tsheets.com/resources/prevent-buddy-punching [https://perma.cc/3PKG-Z2BM] ( last visited 
Aug. 11, 2018) (explaining buddy punching and estimating damages caused by buddy punching to 
employers).  
8. See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186 ¶34 ( Jan. 25, 2019); see also Ben 
Kochman, Users Say Ill. Ruling Should Halt Facebook Face ID Appeal, LAW360 (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1124568/users-say-ill-ruling-should-halt-facebook-face-id-appeal 
[https://perma.cc/QK7L-NNUF] (discussing the impact of the decision on pending litigation). 
9.   For examples of these court decisions, see infra note 20. 
10. For a discussion of biometric security, see infra notes 103–103 and accompanying text. 
11. For examples of these court decisions, see infra note 20. 
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justification for protecting biometric privacy, and it would likely require little 
regulation. Many cases will therefore be dismissed if this is the only rationale for 
protecting biometric privacy. If one is concerned about the possibility of tracking 
people in public using facial recognition, however, then the data security 
conversation is beside the point—even perfect security against the outside world is 
of little use if the company that collected and owns the data is allowed to use it as it 
likes. This concern is addressed only by use and collection restrictions and would 
require extensive regulation. Further, if one believes that the collection of biometric 
information represents a dignitary affront, then harm occurs at the moment of 
unauthorized information acquisition even if no further actions are taken. This set 
of harms can only be addressed by outright bans or strong notice and consent 
requirements. Again, this could justify intrusive regulation and would lead courts to 
find harm in a wide range of cases. 
These various concerns are not mutually exclusive; one could be uneasy with 
biometric information collection for many reasons. These concerns also may not be 
entirely distinct; one could view biometric collection as a dignitary affront because 
of the practical implications for public tracking rather than for abstract or 
philosophical reasons. Nevertheless, it is useful to distinguish between these 
potential “whys.” Particularly, it is very important to know whether we should be 
thinking only in terms of data security when we are contemplating harms or whether 
we should take a broader approach.  
One purpose of this Article is to evaluate which of these rationales speaks to 
Americans’ concerns. Privacy law has often looked to public norms to understand 
the extent and nature of privacy rights. In their seminal article, The Right of Privacy, 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis grounded their call for greater legal protection 
of privacy in law’s recognition “of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and his 
intellect.”12 Similarly, the Supreme Court has referenced public understandings 
when considering who can give consent to searches of shared private spaces13 and 
in evaluating whether a location or an item counts as private at all.14 Finally, there is 
 
12. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193, 
213 (1890); see also id. at 195 (“For years there has been a feeling that the law must afford some remedy 
for the unauthorized circulation of portraits of private persons; and the evil of invasion of privacy by 
the newspapers, long keenly felt, has been but recently discussed by an able writer.”). 
13. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006) (“The constant element in assessing Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness in the consent cases, then, is the great significance given to widely shared 
social expectations.”). 
14. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000) (“When a bus passenger places 
a bag in an overhead bin, he expects that other passengers or bus employees may move it for one reason 
or another. Thus, a bus passenger clearly expects that his bag may be handled. He does not expect that 
other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner.”); 
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990) (“To hold that an overnight guest has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in his host’s home merely recognizes the everyday expectations of privacy that 
we all share. Staying overnight in another’s home is a longstanding social custom that serves functions 
recognized as valuable by society.”); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (“The public is fully 
aware that it is accorded less privacy in its automobiles because of this compelling governmental need 
for regulation. Historically, ‘individuals always [have] been on notice that movable vessels may be 
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a growing movement in Fourth Amendment scholarship to make the extent of 
privacy protections partially contingent on popular expectations.15 
The stakes in the biometric privacy domain are high, making the question 
especially urgent. Statutory damages under the Illinois statute start at $1000 per 
negligent violation and go to $5000 for intentional or reckless violations.16 National 
technology companies are therefore changing their behavior in response to this 
law,17 and lobbying over new biometric legislation has been fierce.18 And many of 
the best anti-privacy arguments, both in the courtroom and the statehouse, all turn 
on harm. Is your face really private given that you show it so readily to people you 
meet? What are you afraid is going to happen?  
This Article seeks to address these questions using data collected from two 
nationally representative surveys. Why, and how much, do people care about 
biometric privacy? Are people uniquely concerned about the collection of biometric 
information, or is such data no different than the dozens of other data trails that we 
leave streaming behind us in daily life? Would people be willing to pay fees or forgo 
benefits to protect their biometric information? What reasons would they give for 
doing so? How much do people distinguish between different kinds of biometric 
technologies? Is it a problem if biometrics are collected with the understanding that 
they will be used in one way, and they are instead used in another? 
The data presented here show that people are concerned about the collection 
of biometric information, even when it is presented in mundane, matter-of-fact 
contexts. They report that they are willing to forgo benefits to avoid the collection 
of biometric information, and that they would be willing to pay more for services 
to protect biometric privacy.  
Those participants who reported being uncomfortable with biometric data 
collection said that their discomfort stems from many concerns rather than just one. 
Though most participants were concerned about data security and identity theft, 
supermajorities also cited other issues. People said they felt it was invasive for a 
 
stopped and searched on facts giving rise to probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband, 
without the protection afforded by a magistrate’s prior evaluation of those facts.’”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
15. See, e.g., Bernard Chao, Catherine S. Durso, Ian P. Farrell & Christopher T. Robertson, Why 
Courts Fail to Protect Privacy: Race, Age, Bias, and Technology, 106 Cal. L. Rev. 263 (2018); Matthew  
B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and 
the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 259 (2016); Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Henry F. Fradella 
& Ryan G. Fischer, Does Privacy Require Secrecy? Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 19, 52–53 (2015); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at 
“Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993); Alisa Smith, Sean 
Madden & Robert P. Barton, An Empirical Examination of Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital 
Age of GPS, Cell Phone Towers, and Drones, 26 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 111, 133 (2016); Matthew 
Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 139, 177 (2016). 
16. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/20 (2019). 
17. See infra notes 4–56 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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company to collect their biometric data, that the possibility of being publicly tracked 
using their biometrics bothered them, and that they were worried where the 
collection of biometric information could lead in the future.  
People also distinguish sharply between different uses of biometric 
technology. A second data collection, in Part IV, asked participants to report how 
comfortable they were with eighteen different biometric uses. When the biometric 
information was being used for a limited purpose closely related to security—be it 
to lock a smartphone or scan a store for known bad actors—most people were fairly 
comfortable with the technology. For example, 71% said they were comfortable 
with using a fingerprint to unlock a smartphone, and 59% approved of the store-
scanning. When the technology was being used for broad scale public tracking, 
however, people were much less comfortable. Fully 74% were uncomfortable with a 
store using facial recognition to track consumer shopping behavior. In general, 
modest majorities were comfortable with the use of biometrics in the place of 
passwords and large majorities were uncomfortable with more adventurous uses of 
biometrics. So even if people were willing to have their biometric data used in one 
way, they were often resistant to some other uses. And a minority was 
uncomfortable for each possible use. 
All these findings speak to the question of biometric privacy harm and, in 
general, these data support taking a broad view of what counts as harm. The 
meaning of harm is a subject of recurring dispute in privacy litigation, where it is 
central to issues of both standing and remedies.19 Specifically, in the domain of 
biometric privacy, we have seen issues of harm litigated in two separate contexts. 
The first is in disputes over standing: when has a party been harmed such that they 
can sue?20 This is a threshold issue that arises in both federal and state courts.21 At 
 
19.  Matthew S. DeLuca, The Hunt for Privacy Harms After Spokeo, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2439, 
2457–66 (2018) (reviewing standing in recent privacy suits); Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, 
Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 748 (2018) (noting that “harm 
drives the way courts think about data-breach cases”). 
20. Compare Santana v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 717 F. App’x 12, 15 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(“We further conclude, pursuant to the second step of our inquiry, that none of the alleged procedural 
violations here raise a material risk of harm to this interest.”), and Howe v. Speedway LLC, No. 17-CV-
07303, 2018 WL 2445541, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018) (“Defendants undoubtedly violated BIPA if 
[they committed procedural violations]. However, those procedural violations did not cause him an 
injury-in-fact.”), with Patel v. Facebook, Inc., No. 18-15982, 2019 WL 3727424, at *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 
2019) (“By contrast, Facebook’s alleged collection, use, and storage of plaintiffs’ face templates here is 
the very substantive harm targeted by BIPA. Because we conclude that BIPA protects the plaintiffs’ 
concrete privacy interests and violations of the procedures in BIPA actually harm or pose a material 
risk of harm to those privacy interests, the plaintiffs have alleged a concrete and particularized harm, 
sufficient to confer Article III standing.”) (internal citations omitted), and Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc., 
No. 16 C 10984, 2017 WL 4099846, at *8 n.5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017) (finding federal jurisdiction and 
declining to dismiss).  
21. See, e.g., federal cases cited supra note 20; state cases such as Greer v. Ill. Hous. Dev. Auth., 
122 Ill. 2d 462, 492–93 (1988). 
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the close of this Article, we shall examine in detail how the study results should 
inform the standing analysis in these ongoing cases.22  
The second context in which this question arose was the interpretation of the 
Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), under which much of the 
current litigation has been filed. This statute provides a private right of action to 
“aggrieved” parties.23 Defendants had generally argued that only data security-style 
harms are concrete enough to make a person “aggrieved,” with plaintiffs naturally 
replying that even minor violations of the notice and consent provisions of the 
statute are sufficient.24 The Illinois Supreme Court recently resolved this statutory 
question in favor of the plaintiffs’ interpretation, holding that violations of the 
statute’s notice and consent provisions are not “merely” technical.25 “When a 
private entity fails to adhere to the statutory procedures . . . ‘[T]he right of the 
individual to maintain [his or] her biometric privacy vanishes into thin air. The 
precise harm the Illinois legislature sought to prevent is then realized.’”26 
In taking this view, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted an explicitly broad 
view of the kinds of rights that biometric privacy legislation can legitimately seek to 
protect—it treated control of biometric information as an inherent good.27 Many of 
the federal courts receiving these cases have taken a narrower view.28 Going 
forward, we will continue to see this question litigated in a variety of contexts. 
Perhaps most importantly, each state will have to answer it as they seek to draft 
their own privacy legislation. In Massachusetts, for instance, the state legislature is 
currently considering a bill that would codify the same broad understanding of 
biometric rights that is now the law in Illinois.29 
Part I of this Article begins by reviewing the ways in which biometric 
technology is currently being used and the kinds of protections provided by current 
 
22. See infra Part IV.C. 
23. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2019). According to the primary architect of the statute, this 
terminology was borrowed from the Illinois Civil Rights Act of 2003. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23 (2019).  
24. See, e.g., Order re Class Certification at 9–10, In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 
No. 3:15-CV-03747-JD, 2018 WL 1794295, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2018) (“Facebook contends that 
[the] issue[ ] can only be resolved by individual evidence of . . . whether a class member is ‘aggrieved’ as 
that word is used in BIPA . . . .”); Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., No. 16-CG-13, 2017 WL 
6523910, at *2 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 21, 2017), perm. app. granted, 98 N.E.3d 36 (Ill. 2018) (summarizing 
defendants’ argument that plaintiff had no standing because she failed to allege any actual injury). 
25. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 34. 
26. Id. (quoting Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 948, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2018)). 
27. Id. 
28. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Rexnord LLC, No. 17-CV-9019, 2018 WL 3239715, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 
3, 2018) (“A person’s privacy may be invaded if her biometric information is obtained or disclosed 
without her consent or knowledge . . . . But notice and consent violations do not without more create 
a risk of disclosure.”); see also supra note 20. 
29. Nadia Dreid, Mass. Bill Would Make Clandestine Data Harvesting An Injury, LAW360  
( Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1123807/mass-bill-would-make-clandestine-
data-harvesting-an-injury [https://perma.cc/6B8S-C8Q4] (“Under the proposed bill, individuals 
wouldn’t have to show how they had been injured by a company’s gathering of their data - the fact that 
it had been collected at all without their consent would be considered an injury itself.”). 
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state privacy laws. Part II presents data from a nationally representative survey that 
seeks to answer the question of whether people value biometric privacy, and 
whether they are willing to make sacrifices to preserve it. Part III considers the 
various rationales that have been advanced for protecting biometric privacy and 
tests how they relate to the public’s stated motivations in that same study. Part IV 
presents a second study that considers how the public feels about a wide range of 
different uses of biometric technology. Finally, Part V reviews the implications of 
these results both from the standpoint of privacy theory and in terms of the 
concrete question of Article III standing. 
I. BIOMETRIC PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 
Biometric identification is becoming ubiquitous in society. Many employers 
make their employees clock into and out of work using fingerprints rather than 
timecards.30 Banks and other financial institutions use biometrics of all sorts for an 
extra level of security31 and now so do some educational testing centers.32 Airlines 
have considered using facial recognition to verify passenger identities at check-in.33 
Retail stores use facial recognition to track suspected shoplifters,34 and some 
 
30. For an example of claims stemming from the use of this type of time-keeping technology, 
see Dixon v. Washington & Jane Smith Cmty.—Beverly, No. 17 C 8033, 2018 WL 2445292, at *1  
(N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018) (BIPA claim for employer’s mandate that employees clock in and out of work 
by scanning fingerprints onto Kronos biometric timekeeping device). For details of the product,  
see Kronos InTouch Timeclock, KRONOS, https://www.kronos.com/products/kronos-intouch [https:/
/perma.cc/X6NX-RVYR] ( last visited Sept. 5, 2019). 
31. E.g., VANGUARD, ACCESS YOUR ACCOUNT BY PHONE SECURELY AND CONVENIENTLY 
USING VANGUARD VOICE VERIFICATION (2011), HTTPS://PERSONAL.VANGUARD.COM/PDF/ 
C106.PDF?2210065141 [https://perma.cc/2RT5-H29C]; see also Lisa Jane McGuire, Banking on 
Biometrics: Your Bank’s New High-Tech Method of Identification May Mean Giving up Your Privacy, 33 
AKRON L. REV. 441, 443–45 (2000); From Fingerprints to Faces: Bank of America Explores Biometrics’ 
Next Phase, PYMNTS.COM (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.pymnts.com/news/security-and-
risk/2017/bank-of-america-biometrics-facial-recogniton/ [https://perma.cc/DA2Q-5689]. 
32. Lauraann Wood, Test Cos. Face Ill. Biometric Lawsuits Over Finger, Vein Scans, LAW360 
( July 10, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1061573/test-cos-face-ill-biometric-lawsuits-over-
finger-vein-scans [https://perma.cc/6X7A-UUXJ]. 
33.  Mark Albert, Airport Biometrics Expand: Bag Drop, Check-in, Lounge Access, Boarding, 
VOYAGE REP. ( June 1, 2017), https://www.voyagereport.com/news/airport-biometrics-expand/ 
[https://perma.cc/4BFQ-A6KF]; Hugo Martin, JetBlue and Delta Begin Testing Biometrics to Identify 
Passengers, L.A. TIMES ( June 1, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-airline-biometrics-
20170601-story.html [https://perma.cc/3S54-WBUE]; Benjamin Zhang, Delta Wants to Use Facial 
Recognition Technology to Make Checking Your Bags Easier, BUS. INSIDER (May 15, 2017), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/delta-facial-recognition-software-check-bag-lines-2017-5 [https://
perma.cc/WR6V-YNWW]. 
34.  Lowe’s U.S. Privacy Statement, LOWE’S, (ver. effective Nov. 20, 2017, available at https://
perma.cc/U6M9-4AMR) (“In some stores, we may use facial recognition technologies to identify 
known shoplifters. Specifically, we may use specialized cameras to scan the faces of persons entering 
the facility and create a unique set of data points. These data points are compared—in real time—
against data points of faces of shoplifters who have previously agreed in writing that they will no longer 
be allowed in our stores. The scan data is retained only if we identify a biometric match to our database 
of known shoplifters. Otherwise, the scan data is immediately deleted. We do not use facial recognition 
or other biometric identifiers for marketing purposes or to build profiles of shoppers.” Based on 
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companies are reportedly using it to track all shoppers in their stores.35 Walgreens 
is now piloting a line of “smart coolers” that use facial analysis to detect the sex and 
approximate age of those who open them.36 Companies are even marketing 
biometric identification to churches and schools as a means of tracking attendance 
and participation.37 Perhaps most famously, Apple has allowed people to use their 
fingerprints to unlock their phones for years, and it added a facial recognition 
option for their latest phone model in 2017.38  
Overseas, biometric usage has already been taken to the next level. The 
Chinese government, for instance, has deployed facial recognition systems to 
identify people at public events who are suspected of minor crimes,39 and it is also 
using facial recognition to identify jaywalkers and red-light runners.40 Though some 
might be concerned merely by the automated detection and punishment of petty 
crimes, there is a further issue specific to the Chinese context. China’s government-
run “social credit system” rewards and punishes citizens based on characteristics 
such as honesty, norm-following, and general courtesy,41 and it appears that 
biometric tracking is being used to further increase the system’s accuracy.42 This 
 
information saved on web.archive.org, this language appears to have been removed from the live 
version of the privacy policy on July 27, 2018). 
35. Annie Lin, Facial Recognition Is Tracking Customers As They Shop in Stores, Tech Company 
Says, CNBC (Nov. 23, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/23/facial-recognition-is-tracking-
customers-as-they-shop-in-stores-tech-company-says.html [https://perma.cc/8QJN-YAEU]. 
36. See Sidney Fussell, Now Your Groceries See You, Too, ATLANTIC ( Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/01/walgreens-tests-new-smart-coolers/ 
581248/ [https://perma.cc/8UTD-66KG]. 
37. See Church Management, BAYOMETRIC, http://www.bayometric.co.uk/biometric-church-
management/ [https://perma.cc/D4KJ-CRXT] ( last visited Aug. 11, 2018); IDENTIMETRICS INC., 
THE GROWTH OF BIOMETRICS IN SCHOOLS (2017), available at https://www.identimetrics.net/ 
images/Growth-of-Biometrics-in-Schools.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Y96-U4U4]. 
38. In September 2017, Apple Inc. launched an iPhone that users can unlock with their face. 
The Future is Here: iPhone X, APPLE: NEWSROOM (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.apple.com/ 
newsroom/2017/09/the-future-is-here-iphone-x/ [https://perma.cc/LL4B-PX5A]. 
39. See Stanley Lubman, The Unprecedented Reach of China’s Surveillance State, CHINA FILE 
(Sept. 15, 2017), http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/unprecedented-reach-of-
chinas-surveillance-state [https://perma.cc/ASX6-7KUM].  
40. See Dake Kang, Chinese ‘Gait Recognition’ Tech IDs People by How They Walk, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/bf75dd1c26c947b7826d270a16e2658a [https:// 
perma.cc/E8GJ-JBDK] (“Chinese police are using facial recognition to identify people in crowds and 
nab jaywalkers, and are developing an integrated national system of surveillance camera data.”); Renlian 
Shibie Xitong Luxu Jiuwei Chuanghongdeng Jiangnaru Chengxin Zhidu (人脸识别系统陆续就位 闯
红灯将纳入诚信 制度) [With Facial Recognition Systems Eventually in Place Jaywalking Will Be Entered 
into Credit Record ], SOHU 搜狐 [SOHU] (Mar. 24, 2018), http://www.sohu.com/a/226282563_351146 
[https://perma.cc/Y26U-9VNA] (describing how facial recognition systems allow for the tracking of 
jaywalking).  
41. Xin Dai, Toward a Reputation State: The Social Credit System Project of China 14 ( June 
10, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3193577 [https://perma.cc/ATC5-G4AY]) (describing the scope of the term “shehui 
xinyong” and the applications of the system). The author is indebted to Dai’s translation of the Sohu 
source, cited in the preceding footnote. 
42. Id. at 32, 47–50, 59 (commenting on both the applications of biometrics and the 
authoritarian objectives the system allows the government to pursue). 
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Chinese facial recognition technology has already been exported to other countries 
and was successfully deployed in Brazil for Carnival in 2019, resulting in several 
arrests.43 Though such extensive use is not currently being considered in the United 
States, facial recognition technology is on the rise even here. For example, a major 
producer of police body cameras is already considering the ethical implications of 
introducing facial recognition to their products.44 
Regardless of a system’s ultimate purpose, most biometrics are used in the 
same two ways: they either identify or authenticate an individual.45 Upon enrollment 
in a biometric system, a person’s biometric identifier is scanned and converted into 
a digital code. When that person is later scanned again, the results of the later scan 
can be compared to those of the earlier scan to determine whether there is a match.46 
This can be done to either confirm an identity of an individual—“Is this Jane, the 
owner of the account?”—or to identify an unknown person by comparing the 
digital code to a database of potential matches. To serve this purpose, biometrics 
identification must be based on some unique physiological characteristic that is 
naturally stable and hard to artificially alter.47 
As of the beginning of 2018, only Illinois, Washington, and Texas had 
biometric privacy laws.48 California passed a broad privacy law that includes 
protection for biometric data that summer and this law will take effect in 2020.49 
 
43. See Fernanda Távora, Gabrielle Araújo and Jordan Sousa, Scanner facial abre alas e ninguém 
mais se perde no Carnaval (e fora dele) [Facial Scanner Debuts and Nobody Else Gets Lost in Carnival 
(and Out of It) ], TAB (Mar. 3, 2019), https://tab.uol.com.br/noticias/redacao/2019/03/11/carnaval-
abre-alas-para-o-escaner-facial-reconhece-milhoes-e-prende-seis.htm [https://perma.cc/M8AC-
LGNE] (describing the Brazilian use of the technology and several of those arrested); Helton Simões 
Gomes, Reconhecimento facial usado na China é testado no Brasil; saiba como opera [Facial Recognition 
Used in China Is Tested in Brazil; Learn How It Works ], UOL ( Jan. 18, 2019), 
https://noticias.uol.com.br/tecnologia/noticias/redacao/2019/01/18/reconhecimento-facial-usado-
na-china-e-testado-no-brasil-saiba-como-opera.htm [https://perma.cc/6V95-X6RZ] (describing a 
legislative fact-finding trip to China to investigate expanded use of Chinese facial recognition 
technology).  
44. Dana Goodyear, Can the Manufacturer of Tasers Provide the Answer to Police Abuse?,  
NEW YORKER (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/08/27/can-the-
manufacturer-of-tasers-provide-the-answer-to-police-abuse [https://perma.cc/F3JB-K27V]. 
45. April Glaser, Biometrics Are Coming, Along with Serious Security Concerns, WIRED (Mar. 9, 
2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/biometrics-coming-along-serious-security-concerns/ 
[https://perma.cc/GCX9-GVMZ] (defining biometric technology as “technology that does one of 
two things: identifies you or authenticates your identity”).  
46. Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the 
Fourth Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1390–91 (2004); 
McGuire, supra note 31, at 444–45; John D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying 
the Concerns – Drafting the Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 97, 100 (1997). 
47. Daniel J. Steinbock, National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues,  
56 FLA. L. REV. 697, 704–05 (2004). 
48.     740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2019); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (2019); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010 (2019); see also Sharon Roberg-Perez, The Future Is Now: Biometric 
Information and Data Privacy, 30 ANTITRUST 60, 62–63 (2017) (describing the then-current state of 
efforts to pass legislation in other states). 
49. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (2019).  
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The exact definition of biometric information varies state by state. In Illinois, under 
whose Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) all the current litigation has been 
filed, “biometric identifier” is defined to include “a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, 
voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry.”50 Several types of information are 
specifically excluded from the category of biometric identifiers in Illinois, including 
basic demographic information; physical descriptors such as height, weight, and eye 
color; photographs; and most information collected from patients in a healthcare 
setting.51 The definition under Washington State’s law is similar but specifically 
excludes information generated from photographs and videos, such as the facial 
geometry data collected by Facebook from uploaded user photos.52 
The protections offered by different state laws vary meaningfully. In Illinois, 
for example, a private entity cannot collect biometric information unless it provides 
a written privacy policy to the person whose information is being collected.53 This 
policy must contain some very specific disclosures about the purpose of the 
collection and the ways in which the biometric data will be secured. The entity also 
must obtain written consent from the person.54 These notice and consent 
requirements form the basis of every case under BIPA of which the author is aware.  
In general, this set of requirements can be satisfied with appropriately drafted 
privacy policies and consent procedures. If one uses biometric timekeeping for 
one’s employees, an additional form at the time of hiring and some greater attention 
to data security may be all that is required. But compliance is not so easy in other 
contexts. For example, a NEST home security camera equipped with facial 
recognition is programmed to not activate that feature in Illinois; one simply cannot 
get consent from everyone who might approach one’s security cameras so the 
product cannot legally be used.55 Similarly, in Illinois and Texas, Google disabled a 
feature in their Arts and Culture app that allowed people to see what great works of 
art resemble them, presumably over concerns that people would upload 
photographs of others and therefore cause Google to be in violation of state laws 
if it generated biometric scans of these non-consenting individuals.56 Even a cute 
 
50. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2019). 
51. Id.  
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010 (2017). 
53. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10. 
54. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b)(3) (2019). 
55. See, e.g., Tess Townshend, Nest’s New Camera Uses the Same Facial Recognition Tech As 
Google Photos, RECODE (May 31, 2017), https://www.recode.net/2017/5/31/15708124/nest- 
iq-camera-indoor-facial-recognition-technology-google-photos [https://perma.cc/4UPK-RJRU] 
(discussing release of $299 indoor camera with facial recognition software and decision not to make the 
technology available in Illinois). 
56. See, e.g., Ally Marotii, Google’s Art Selfies Aren’t Available in Illinois. Here’s Why,  
CHI. TRIB. ( Jan. 17, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-google-art-selfies-
20180116-story.html [https://perma.cc/V6TX-WNZ4].  
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robotic dog has been excluded from Illinois because it is able to distinguish between 
family members using facial recognition.57 
Home security, arts apps, and robotic puppies aside, there is a further 
provision of BIPA that may be more consequential, at least in the long term, than 
the notice and consent requirements. This provision prohibits a private entity that 
possesses biometric information from selling, leasing, trading, or otherwise 
profiting from that biometric information.58 It therefore outright bans certain kinds 
of commercial conduct rather than requiring informed consent. And these barred 
uses are not obscure. One could easily imagine a major technology company 
wanting to lease access to their facial recognition database to a major producer of 
CCTV cameras. Amazon’s “Rekognition” service, which provides cheap storage 
and analysis of face data, could be a vehicle for such a use.59 Amazon markets its 
service as being able to “perform real-time face searches against collections with 
tens of millions of faces,” “detect, analyze, and index up to 100 faces . . . in a single 
image,” and “analyze sentiments for all faces in group photos, crowded events, and 
public places such as airports and department stores.”60 In Illinois, many of the 
possible uses of this technology would simply be illegal for private actors.  
This bar on profiting from the collection of biometrics is currently unique to 
Illinois.61 The Illinois statute is also unique in another way: only it provides a private 
right of action.62 The statutes in Washington and Texas can only be enforced by the 
state attorney general, and as best the author can determine, there have been no 
enforcement actions filed by those offices.63 Much biometric enforcement in the 
United States therefore comes from private lawsuits filed on behalf of Illinois 
residents. 
 
57. See, e.g., Neil Steinberg, Want This Cute Robot Dog? Tough — Illinois Law Keeps Sony from 
Selling It Here, CHI. SUN TIMES (Nov. 15, 2018), https://chicago.suntimes.com/business/sony-robot-
dog-aibo-biometrics-illinois-supreme-court-lawsuits-informed-consent-abt-electronics/ [https://
perma.cc/MEM5-7PSN] (describing Sony’s robot dog that uses facial recognition to identify different 
family members). 
58. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b). 
59. Amazon Rekognition, AWS, https://aws.amazon.com/rekognition/ [https://perma.cc/
7QTB-JDKY] ( last visited Aug. 11, 2018). Microsoft offers a similar service called “Face API.” See 
Face, MICROSOFT AZURE, https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/cognitive-services/face/ 
[https://perma.cc/SPQ5-YPY6] ( last visited Aug. 11, 2018). 
60. Ranju Das, Amazon Rekognition Announces Real-Time Face Recognition, Support for 




61. See Elvy, supra note 1, at 495 (discussing this difference). 
62. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (“Any person aggrieved by a violation of this Act shall have a 
right of action . . . against an offending party.”). 
63. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(d) (“The attorney general may bring an action to 
recover the civil penalty.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.030 (2019) (“This chapter may be 
enforced solely by the attorney general . . . .”). 
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This brings us to the question that motivates this Article: why? Four states 
have taken at least some action to protect biometric privacy, and bills are being 
considered in several others. What, if anything, is so scary about biometric 
information? Several alternate theories have been advanced. Before addressing 
those, however, we should not discount the possibility that there is absolutely 
nothing special about biometrics. Your fingerprint geometry may not be widely 
known, but it also exposes virtually no personal information. From a mere 
fingerprint, you cannot deduce character, habits, or relationships. Fingerprints are 
also surrendered regularly to the government and to some employers, and certainly 
few people take great pains to avoid leaving them behind in a restaurant.  
A fingerprint is therefore neither revealing nor overly secret. 
One might say a face is different, with facial recognition allowing for tracking 
in public. But faces are different in the anti-privacy sense as well: it is a rare person 
who does not regularly show their face to all whom they pass on the street.64 
Thinking about the ease with which people turn over images of their faces—both 
on social media and by merely appearing in public—it is hard to argue that facial 
geometry is truly private.  
The possibility that biometric information may simply not be private prompts 
the question of how much people value biometric privacy. Are people made less 
comfortable by information collection merely because the collection happens by 
means of biometrics or includes biometrics data? Are they willing to sacrifice some 
benefit, or incur some cost, to keep biometric data private? These are the questions 
that Part II seeks to answer.  
II. DO PEOPLE VALUE BIOMETRIC PRIVACY? 
There are many reasons why people might care about biometric privacy, but 
there is little data indicating how much they do or why they do. The purpose of this 
study was to experimentally compare reactions to accomplishing a goal with and 
without using biometric technology. Specifically, participants were presented with 
realistic monitoring and tracking programs that either worked via biometric 
technologies or worked via ID cards. The primary question was whether people 
were less comfortable with the biometric tracking technologies and whether they 
would be willing to accept some cost, or forgo some benefit, if it allowed them to 
opt out of the biometric regime.  
Though some researchers have conducted surveys on biometric privacy in the 
past, those surveys have tended to focus on particular subject areas rather than 
taking a broad approach. For example, a 2016 survey by Pew asked whether 
 
64. Some proportion of Muslim women wear face-concealing clothing, but this is very rare in 
western countries. See, e.g., Carol Kuruvilla, Danish Muslim Women Protest as Ban on Face Veils Enters 
Full Force, HUFFPOST (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/danish-muslim-women-
protest-as-ban-on-face-veils-enters-full-force_n_5b61ea77e4b0b15aba9f24b0 [https://perma.cc/
KKV5-F7CE] (citing research estimating that only 150–200 women in Denmark choose to wear such). 
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participants would consider it acceptable to install a facial recognition-capable 
surveillance camera in a workplace that had experienced a number of employee 
thefts.65 Fifty-four percent of those surveyed said yes, and twenty-four percent said 
no, but many of the comments made by participants focused on the particulars of 
1) a workplace and 2) a place with a history of thefts.66 It is hard to make sweeping 
claims about biometric privacy from such a focused question. 
Other studies have considered use of biometrics in interactions that have 
traditionally been seen as high-security, such as banks.67 And a survey by Accenture 
Federal Services asked about willingness to share certain kinds of biometric 
information with the government, again a special case.68 Though these types of 
surveys have generally shown moderate to high levels of comfort with biometrics, 
there is some reason to think that people are more comfortable with biometrics in 
these security-conscious contexts than in the mass market.69 The comfort reflected 
in these surveys is also not overly relevant to current litigation because government 
entities and most financial institutions are exempted under BIPA.70 It appears that 
there is almost no research on the kinds of basic consumer uses of biometrics that 
have been the subject of most of the recent lawsuits. Also, an unfortunate 
proportion of the existing data is proprietary—meaning that the details of both the 
questions and the results are unavailable. 
 
65. Lee Rainie & Maeve Duggan, Privacy and Information Sharing: Many Americans Say They 
Might Provide Personal Information, Depending on the Deal Being Offered and How Much Risk They Face, 
PEW RES. CTR. (2015), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2016 
/01/PI_2016.01.14_Privacy-and-Info-Sharing_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/JM4P-4QET]. 
66. Id. at 15î16. 
67. Most of these surveys are, sadly, not publicly available. Results from some of these surveys 
are discussed in a variety of places, however. See INT’L BIOMETRICS & IDENTITY ASS’N, RECENT 
OPINION SURVEYS ON PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF BIOMETRICS (Mar. 2016), https://www.ibia.org/ 
download/datasets/3372%20/Public-Perceptions-of-Biometrics-opinion-surveys%20.pdf [https://
perma.cc/V9R3-WP27]; Justin Lee, Study Finds Americans Support Biometrics-Based Payment Systems, 
BIOMETRICUPDATE.COM ( July 18, 2018), https://www.biometricupdate.com/201707/study-finds-
americans-support-biometrics-based-payment-systems [https://perma.cc/9VT6-N993]. 
68. Majority Willing to Share Biometrics for Better eGovernment, PLANETBIOMETRICS (Apr. 5, 
2018), http://www.planetbiometrics.com/article-details/i/7002/desc/majority-willing-to-share-
biometrics-for-better-egovernment/ [https://perma.cc/N5R6-PDVQ] (discussing results of survey 
regarding the willingness of individuals to share biometric data to improve government services). 
69. Study Explores Biometric Data as ‘Currency’ for Govt Services, PLANETBIOMETRICS (Feb. 4, 
2016), http://www.planetbiometrics.com/article-details/i/4109/desc/study-explores-biometric- 
data-as-currency-for-govt-services/ [https://perma.cc/KFS4-BFQD]; see also Biometric  
Technology Enjoys Strong Support from Consumers, Says CTA, BUS. WIRE (Mar. 30, 2016), 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160330006149/en/Biometric--Technology--Enjoys--
Strong--Support--Consumers--CTA [https://perma.cc/TX5F-HZKR] (noting that “More than half of 
U.S. adults are [comfortable] with the use of biometrics in locations commonly believed to already have 
a high degree of security screening . . . . Also, almost half of consumers are comfortable using biometric 
technologies at home and/or the workplace.”) (emphasis added). The report is sadly not publicly 
available. See also the data presented here in Part IV. 
70. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/25 (2019). 
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One report by Rachel L. German and K. Suzanne Barber did consider privacy 
motives, however.71 They asked those who reported being uncomfortable with 
biometrics to say why. The most common response (43.7%) was that biometrics 
were an invasion of personal privacy, with only 19.3% reporting concern with 
identity theft and 23.6% citing the possibility of government tracking.72 These 
appear to have been exclusive options, however, so they do not shed light on the 
possibility that people might have multiple different reasons for being concerned. 
They also found that people by far had the most experience with fingerprint 
biometrics, that they largely used biometrics to log in to their personal devices and 
accounts, and that on a ranking question, they reported more comfort with 
fingerprint biometrics than with any other kind.73 
None of these existing studies include the kind of experimental data collected 
here. This study considered three different consumer domains in which biometrics 
have been used.  
A. Scenarios and Comfort Ratings 
A sample of American adults was recruited by Research Now/SSI, an online 
survey firm with an established panel.74 The demographics of the sample were set 
to match U.S. census proportions on the dimensions of age, sex, region, education, 
and race/ethnicity. Full demographics are reported in the Appendix. The final 
sample contained 1226 individuals.75 
The purpose of this first study was to see how participants would respond to 
a rich description of biometric technology being used in a real-world context. Each 
participant in the study saw a single biometric privacy scenario from one of three 
domains: employee timekeeping, gym membership check-in, and a coffee shop 
loyalty program.  
The employment vignette put participants in the role of an employee. It 
described how many employers had their employees check into and out of work 
 
71. Rachel L. German & K. Suzanne Barber, Consumer Attitudes About Biometric 
Authentication: A UT CID Report, U. TEX. AUSTIN CTR. FOR IDENTITY (May 2018), 
https://identity.utexas.edu/assets/uploads/publications/Consumer-Attitudes-About-Biometrics.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SX9Q-KY4Q]. 
72. Id. at 15. The authors also report high level of comfort with use of various types of 
biometrics. They do not include much information about the exact question they asked to generate this 
data, however, and repeated requests for further information have not been answered. 
73. Id. at 5–6. 
74. Research Now has since been absorbed by Dynata. Announcing New Name and  
Brand: Research Now SSI Is Now Dynata, DYNATA, (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.dynata.com/ 
press/announcing-new-name-and-brand-research-now-ssi-is-now-dynata/ [https://perma.cc/J29B-
WMVX]. 
75. Inattentive participants were screened from the final sample based on two criteria. First, 
participants who did not give the appropriate response to either of two attention check questions—
questions asking participants to give a particular response—were unable to complete the study. Second, 
participants were screened from the final sample if they finished the study in less than one-third of the 
time taken by the median participant. 
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and that, though this is more common among hourly employees, it is increasingly 
used for salaried employees as well. The description continued with a review of the 
check-in process. Upon arrival, the employee would scan either their ID card or, in 
the biometric condition, their thumbprint, at a machine by the company’s main 
entrance. They would repeat the process upon departure.  
The vignette then went on to describe the employer’s data retention policy. 
All participants were told that the employer would keep the arrival and departure 
information indefinitely and could use it for any purpose. In the ID card condition, 
the policy stopped there. In the biometric conditions, the policy continued in one 
of two ways. Some biometric participants were told that the thumbprint information 
would be kept indefinitely and could be shared or sold. Other biometric participants 
were told that the information would be destroyed upon an employee’s departure 
from the company and would never be shared or sold. 
There was a further nuance to the biometric conditions. Some participants 
were given a full justification for biometric timekeeping: “The company began using 
thumbprints last year to avoid what it called the buddy punch problem. Some 
employees were having friends sign them in or out. The use of thumbprints ensures 
that people can only check themselves in and out.” Others were only given the 
following seven words: “The company began using thumbprints last year.” Many 
lawsuits under BIPA are about employers using fingerprint scanners to monitor 
their employees’ arrivals and departures, so this vignette was well in line with the 
facts of actual cases.76 
Here is the text of the thumbprint scenario in which the biometric data were 
not destroyed and no justification was given: 
Many employers require their employees to check in and out when they 
enter and leave work. This is particularly common for hourly employees, 
but is increasingly used for salaried employees as well. Imagine that you are 
working at a company that tracks its employees in this way. At the 
beginning of every shift, you scan your thumbprint at a machine by the 
company’s main entrance. The machine compares the thumbprint with its 
database of employee thumbprints and marks you as having arrived. The 
process repeats at the end of the day as you scan out at a different machine. 
The employer keeps this arrival and departure data indefinitely and can use 
it for any purpose. 
The company also retains a record of the thumbprints for all current and 
former employees and keeps that information indefinitely. It never deletes 
the thumbprint information. It is free to use the information for any 
purpose, including sharing it or selling it. 




76. For examples of these court decisions, see infra note 6.  
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There were five variants of this scenario: a 2 (thumbprint data destroyed or 
retained) x 2 (thumbprint use justified or not) design with a control condition (ID 
card). The control condition was oversampled such that it received one third of the 
total participant pool. A figure showing the list of variants for each scenario appears 
later in this Section. 
After the scenario was presented, all participants were asked to answer two 
questions on 0-100 scales ranging from Very Uncomfortable to Very Comfortable. 
The first question asked how comfortable they were with the company’s method of 
checking in at work. The second question asked how comfortable they were with 
the company’s data retention policy. These two questions were used in each of the 
other scenario domains as well. 
The other two scenario domains were checking in at a gym and using a loyalty 
rewards program at a coffee shop. These scenarios were fundamentally quite similar 
to each other. The gym scenario described how many gyms have members check in 
with a card or key fob. Participants were then told that their gym either used this 
same method or instead used either thumbprints or facial recognition.  
For the gym vignette, there were again five variants: a keycard condition, two 
thumbprint conditions, and two facial recognition conditions.77 The four conditions 
that included biometric information had the same privacy policy options as in the 
employment case. Participants were either told the biometric information would be 
destroyed when it was no longer needed and would never be shared, or that the 
information was the gym’s to do with as it pleased. No justification information was 
provided. 
Here is the facial recognition gym scenario in which the biometric information 
is being protected: 
Many gyms require their members to check in when they arrive. This is 
sometimes done by showing identification at a desk, but is increasingly 
automated by having people scan a card or keychain tag.  
Imagine that you are a member of a gym that tracks when members arrive 
using facial recognition. Upon arrival, you look directly at a scanner and it 
matches your facial geometry to your membership information. This is also 
how the gym’s lockers work. Each locker is similarly equipped with a 
scanner. 
The gym retains a record of the arrival and departure times for all current 
and former members and keeps the information forever. It is free to use 
the information for any purpose and share or sell it. 
The gym retains a record of the facial recognition information of all current 
members, but deletes the facial recognition information within one month 
of their membership ending. The gym only uses the facial recognition 
information to track attendance and will never use the information for any 
other purpose or share or sell it. 
 
77. In both the gym and coffee shop domains the control condition was again oversampled. 
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The gym vignette may seem somewhat fanciful at first glance, but there are 
two pending BIPA cases with similar facts. In Sekura v. Krishna Schaumberg Tan,78 
the plaintiff alleges that the defending salon used fingerprint biometrics to track her 
use of their services. And McCollough v. Smarte Carte concerns use of biometric 
lockers.79 
The same types of conditions were used in the coffee shop vignette: card, 
thumbprint, or facial recognition, with biometric data either being protected or not. 
Here, the information was used to administer a customer loyalty program: 
Imagine that you regularly go to a coffee shop or restaurant that tracks 
when customers arrive using thumbprints. As you approach the register, 
you press your thumb onto a scanner and it matches your thumbprint to 
your customer information. 
This system lets the person at the register greet customers by name, suggest 
favorite orders, and track bonus discounts. 
In all three of these sets of scenarios, the data privacy protection that 
sometimes applied to the biometric information was never extended to  
non-biometric information. In the coffee shop domain, for example, all participants 
were told, “The coffee shop retains a record of the order information for all current 
and former members of its customer loyalty program and keeps the information 
indefinitely. It is free to use the information for any purpose.” This was done to 
ensure that any comfort derived from biometric information security policies was 
specific to biometric information and that participants would not assume that other 
customer information was similarly protected.80 In the sample gym scenario above, 
you can note the same contrast between arrival and departure information (not 




78. Sekura v. Krishna Schaumberg Tan, Inc., No. 1-18-0175, 2018 WL 4699213  
(Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 28, 2018). 
79. McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc., No. 16 C 03777, 2016 WL 4077108 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 
2016). 
80. The two biometric information protection policies that participants saw for the thumbprint 
conditions were: 
The coffee shop also retains the thumbprint information of all current and former members of its 
customer loyalty program forever. It is also free to use the thumbprint information for any purpose and 
share or sell it.  
OR 
The coffee shop retains a record of the thumbprint information of all current members of its customer 
loyalty program but deletes a member’s records within one month of them cancelling their membership 
or after a period of inactivity. The coffee shop only uses the thumbprint information to track customer 
orders and will never use the information for any other purpose or share it. 
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The below figure summarizes the various experimental conditions: 
Employer Gym Coffee Shop 
ID card ID card ID card 
Thumb-Destroy-Justified Thumb-Destroy Thumb-Destroy 
Thumb-Destroy-Not Justified Thumb-Retain Thumb-Retain 
Thumb-Retain-Justified Face-Destroy Face-Destroy 
Thumb-Retain-Not Justified Face-Retain Face-Retain 
 
As can be seen in Table 1 and Figure 1, collecting biometric information 
substantially reduced comfort in each domain. For the employment domain, use of 
thumbprints made participants on average about 9 points less comfortable on the 
101-point scale. For the gym context, it was 9.5 points. For the coffee shop, 
however, it was 28.8 points. When facial recognition information was used, it 
similarly made people less comfortable on average: 21.5 points lower than control 
in the coffee shop domain and 13.9 in the gym domain. Biometric tracking therefore 
was consistently a source of greater discomfort. 
 
Figure 1: Estimated Comfort Levels by Type of ID Used 
Note: Based on the regression reported in Table 1. The comfort dependent measure 
ranged from 0 to 100 with higher numbers indicating greater comfort. Estimated at 
Age = 35, Female = 0, Social Class and Education = 3.   
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In something of a puzzle, the data protection provisions provided different 
levels of comfort across domains. In the employment context, having biometric 
information collected with a data security provision (marked “destroy” in Table 1) 
actually resulted in higher levels of comfort than not collecting biometrics at all. In 
the coffee and gym domains, this effect was smaller and only significant on the 
questions that specifically referenced the data retention policies.  
The data reveal a few noteworthy demographic differences. First, those with 
higher self-reported social class are significantly more comfortable on four of the 
six measures, and the effect is in the same direction on the two measures for which 
it is not significant. This is a main effect on comfort with tracking and is not specific 
to any particular method of monitoring (keycard or biometrics), so it should be 
understood as a greater acceptance of monitoring for customer loyalty benefits and 
check-ins more generally. This effect was not anticipated.81 One possibility is that 
those of higher social class get more benefits from these sorts of programs and are 
more accustomed to them. Anyone who has flown domestically is familiar with the 
kinds of benefits that can come with “status” on an airline, for instance, and such 
status comes at substantial cost. Another possibility is that those of lower class are 
more likely to have had negative experiences with these programs. Though some 
companies track the movements of employees of every level,82 being penalized for 
being slightly late is likely more commonly the experience for hourly employees. 
More surprising is the effect of age in the coffee shop and gym contexts. 
Several papers have shown that younger people have greater privacy expectations 
and place a higher value on many kinds of privacy.83 Here, however, the young are 
slightly more comfortable than the old with these tracking programs, reversing that 
pattern. This effect appears to be present only in the two non-employment 
contexts—the gym and the coffee shop—and is non-significantly in the other 
direction for the employment measures. Again, we can only speculate about why 
this effect may be present. Perhaps younger people do not value privacy in this kind 
 
81. A reanalysis of the expectations of privacy data collected by Matthew B. Kugler and Lior  
J. Strahilevitz did not reveal an independent effect of social class. Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Strahilevitz, 
Assessing the Empirical Upside of Personalized Criminal Procedure, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).  
82. Kaveh Waddell, Why Bosses Can Track Their Employees 24/7, ATLANTIC ( Jan. 6, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/employer-gps-tracking/512294/ [https: 
//perma.cc/M3UQ-ZZGY]. 
83.  Bernard Chao, Ian Farrell, Catherine Durso & Christopher Robertson, Why Courts Fail to 
Protect Privacy: Race, Age, Bias and Technology, 106 CAL. L. REV. 263, 312–14 (2018) (showing that the 
middle aged had slightly higher privacy expectations against government surveillance than the young 
and much higher expectations than the old); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior J. Strahilevitz, Actual 
Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 
252–54 (2016) (showing that people with lower privacy expectations against a government search are 
older); Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 81 (showing a significant negative effect of age on privacy 
expectations against government surveillance in Table 4 such that older people had lower expectations); 
Matthew B. Kugler & Thomas Rousse, The Privacy Hierarchy: Trade Secret and Fourth Amendment 
Expectations, IOWA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (showing a negative effect of age on privacy 
expectations in the law enforcement context, but no effect in the corporate surveillance domain). 
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of customer loyalty program as much as older people. Or perhaps younger people 
place greater value on automated check-in and ordering.84 
B. Willingness to Pay 
Participants also completed a willingness-to-pay style question in each domain. 
The nature of this question necessarily varied by context. In the case of the coffee 
shop loyalty program, the question described a customer loyalty program 
(administered using either cards or biometrics) and asked whether the survey 
respondent would want to participate. Were the program card-based, 77.0% would 
want to participate in exchange for every tenth coffee free. On average, only 46.6% 
would want to participate if the program used biometrics. Results from all 
conditions are reported in Table 2. 
The gym and employment domains did not lend themselves to so natural a 
question. Likely an employer or gym would either have biometrics, or it wouldn’t. 
The author is aware of no program by which an employer or gym has an “option” 
of using biometric check-in that it incentivizes with a reward. The willingness-to-
pay questions here were therefore somewhat more artificial. Participants in the 
biometric conditions for these two domains were asked whether they would be 
willing to pay some amount of money to switch to a non-biometric check-in 
procedure. On average, 44.4% in the gym domain and 33.3% in the employment 
domain said they would be willing to pay some amount.85 Though it may seem odd 
to have an employee pay an employer for a benefit like this, employers regularly 
take payroll deductions for employee parking and other optional employment 
benefits. 
Within each domain, some interesting patterns emerged. For the employment 
domain, having a policy by which the information could not be shared and would 
be destroyed upon departure from the company made people less likely to be willing 
to pay.86 Providing a justification did not have a significant effect.87  
In the gym domain, providing those same kinds of assurances that the 
information would be contained had no significant effect.88 There was, however, a 
 
84. See, e.g., Hayley Peterson, Millennials’ Hatred of ‘Dealing with People’ Is a Major Threat to 
Fast-Food Workings, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/millennials-
hate-interacting-with-people-2016-8 [https://perma.cc/EUU3-VBYA].  
85. In the gym domain, participants indicating a willingness to pay were asked how much they 
would be willing to pay assuming a baseline gym membership fee of $40 a month. The mean was $16.87 
a month and did not vary significantly by condition. 
86. A chi square was conducted using examining whether willingness to pay (yes/no) varied as 
a function of “destroy” (yes/no). This collapses across justification conditions. Ʒ2 (2, N = 249) = 6.33, 
p = .012 
87. Ʒ2 (2, N = 249) = 1.58, p = .209. Given that providing a justification was non-significantly 
associated with greater comfort, one might wonder why it is also non-significantly associated with 
greater willingness to pay to opt out of the system. But consider that the justification was that biometrics 
limited an employee’s ability to cheat the system. Though this might reassure the employees about the 
employer’s intent, it does highlight the conflict in incentives. 
88. Ʒ2 (2, N = 280) = .144, p = .705. 
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significant effect of the information being facial recognition data rather than 
thumbprint data such that more people were willing to pay to opt out of facial 
recognition use.89  
 
Table 2: Willingness to Pay Questions by Domain 
Note: In the coffee domain, a “Yes” answer indicates a willingness to participate in a 
program despite data collection. In the other two domains, a “Yes” answer indicates a 
willingness to pay to opt out of such a program. Since the gym and employer cases 
involved willingness to pay to switch to a keycard regime, the question was not asked in 
the control conditions. 
 
In the coffee shop domain, interest in participating in the loyalty program did 
not significantly vary based on either type of biometric data or data retention 
policy.90 Since the coffee question merely asked whether the participant wanted to 
 
89. Ʒ2 (2, N = 280) = 6.86, p = .009. 
90. Ʒ2 (2, N = 270) = .801, p = .371 and Ʒ2 (2, N = 270) = 2.86, p = .091, respectively. 
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be in the loyalty program, however, it was possible to compare the responses in the 
control condition to those in the four biometric conditions overall. People were 
significantly less likely to want to participate if the program worked via biometrics, 
with 77% wanting to participate in the control condition and only 46.6% wanting 
to participate in the biometric conditions.91  
In all three domains, then, a meaningful number of people either expressed a 
willingness to give up a benefit in exchange for avoiding a program that used 
biometrics (coffee shop) or a willingness to pay to opt out of a biometric program 
(gym and employer). These participants appear to have translated their increased 
discomfort with biometric programs into avoidance of them. The nature of the 
biometric program, whether it was facial recognition or thumbprint based and 
whether it had a privacy-attentive data retention policy, had inconsistent effects. But 
the general concern with biometrics programs was reliable across contexts. 
III. WHY PROTECT BIOMETRIC PRIVACY 
The previous Section shows that many people do value biometric privacy and 
that they are willing to sacrifice benefits in order to preserve it. This raises the 
question discussed at the beginning of the paper: why? What is the point of 
biometric privacy? 
A. BIPA’s Motivations and Other Possible Rationales 
Since BIPA is by far the most expansive of the laws currently protecting 
biometric privacy, it is instructive to consider why it was passed and what its 
advocates considered its primary purpose. The specific motivating event for the 
passage of BIPA was the bankruptcy of a firm called Pay by Touch.92 This 
company’s principal product was a payment system that allowed people to complete 
a retail transaction with a fingerprint.93 When the company filed for bankruptcy in 
2007, one of its primary assets was its trove of consumer fingerprint and financial 
records.94 The privacy ombudsman in the case excluded the biometric data from 
sale because selling or licensing the data would have violated Pay by Touch’s privacy 
policy: “Pay By Touch will not rent, sell, license, or lend your [personally identifiable 
information] to third parties for advertising or marketing without your consent.”95 
Nevertheless, Pay by Touch’s records had contained data from a large number of 
Illinois residents. The prospect that this compilation of information could have 
been sold was enough to spur the Illinois legislature into action. 
 
91. Ʒ2 (2, N = 405) = 33.83, p < .001. 
92. The story of this case is reviewed in Lucy L. Thomson, Sensitive Personal Data for Sale in 
Bankruptcy—An Uncertain Future for Privacy Protection, 2017 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 12 (2017);  
see also H.R. Deb., 95th Gen. Assemb., at 249 (Ill. 2008) (statement of Kathy Ryg), available at 
http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans95/09500276.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6J2-42A3]. 
93. Thomson, supra note 92. 
94. Id. 
95. See id.; 11 U.S.C.A. § 332. 
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The legislative debate surrounding BIPA is notable for the absence of those 
actors who have subsequently expressed the greatest opposition. None of the 
witnesses who appeared, testified, or submitted written statements regarding BIPA 
were affiliated with the technology industry. Only one witness—James Ferg Cadima 
of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)—spoke on the record in any 
surviving committee discussion.96 Most of the witnesses who submitted witness 
slips—but do not appear to have spoken on the record—represented interests 
related to state or local government.97 Though two witnesses marked that they were 
opposed in the early stages of the committee discussion—one each from Cook 
County and the state police—subsequent amendments exempting government 
agencies and government contractors appear to have alleviated their concerns.98 
There is no evidence of any lobbying, or even awareness, by Silicon Valley. This is, 
unsurprisingly, no longer the case. Biometric legislation is now fiercely contested by 
Facebook and Google, among others.99  
The text of the bill and the legislative history presents data security as the 
primary justification for treating biometrics as special. According to the statute, 
 
96. Transcript of House Rules Committee meeting on May 28, 2008 (on file with author). The 
Senate Committees do not record their sessions and no witness spoke on the floor of either body. 
97. Bill Folder of Senate Bill 2400, 95th Illinois Gen. Assemb. (on file with author). Of the 
eleven unique witnesses to have submitted witness slips for either chamber’s committee meeting, two 
were from the Illinois Secretary of State’s office, two represented law enforcement, one each came 
from the Chicago of Chicago and Cook County, and one represented the American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal employees. The remaining witnesses were James Ferg Cadmina from the ACLU 
and three representatives of banking or medical interest groups. 
98. See S.B. 36 (Ill. 2018), S. Comm, Amendment 1 (exempting public agencies involved in 
criminal investigations or issuing driver’s licenses, which is a major task of the IL Secretary of State’s 
office); H. Comm. Amendment 1 (fully exempting public agencies and also financial institutions subject 
to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999). Two representatives of a banking lobby group were also 
present at the committee meetings, and H. Comm. Amendment 1 also exempted much of their industry. 
An interview with James Ferg Cadima ( July, 9, 2018) and subsequent correspondence confirms what 
is apparent from the record: the only major opposition to the bill was from government actors that 
were concerned they would be unable to ensure their own compliance, and this opposition evaporated 
after the amendments were added. The medical lobbyists were similarly neutral after the amendment 
passed. 
99. See, e.g., Russell Brandon, Facebook-backed Lawmakers Are Pushing to Gut Privacy Law, 
VERGE (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/10/17218756/facebook-biometric-
privacy-lobbying-bipa-illinois [https://perma.cc/5DRP-4JD7] (discussing attempts by Illinois 
legislators to revise BIPA’s provisions); April Glaser, Facebook Is Using an “NRA Approach” to Defend 
Its Creepy Facial Recognition Programs, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (Aug. 4, 2017), http://www.slate.com/ 
blogs/future_tense/2017/08/04/facebook_is_fighting_biometric_facial_recognition_privacy_laws.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/KZ9U-TZ6E] (discussing Facebook’s attempts to kill BIPA);  
Kartikay Mehrotra, After Facebook Lobbying Failed, Google Takes Aim at U.S. Law Banning Use of 
Biometric Data Without Consent, JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/ 
news/2018/04/26/world/facebook-lobbying-failed-google-takes-aim-u-s-law-banning-use-biometric-
data-without-consent/#.XXLZF5NKjdd [https://perma.cc/2VBY-HWKT] (discussing Google’s 
attempt to propose BIPA revisions); Sara Merken, New Illinois Attorney General Ready for Biometric 
Privacy Fight (1), BLOOMBERG L. BIG L. BUS. (Nov. 8, 2018), https://biglawbusiness.com/new-
illinois-attorney-general-ready-for-biometric-privacy-fight-1 [https://perma.cc/A67L-GV3P] 
(discussing the role of the new Illinois Attorney General in the ongoing legislative debates). 
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BIPA was enacted because biometric information is “biologically unique to the 
individual; therefore, once compromised, the individual has no recourse, is at 
heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to withdraw from biometric-facilitated 
transactions.”100 The whitepaper submitted by the ACLU in support of the bill—
the only written submission in the legislative record—and comments on the floor 
in support of the bill affirm this data security purpose.101  
Biometric information, whether a thumbprint, a voiceprint, or a record of 
facial geometry, can be seen as the worst form of password. It is both common to 
multiple vendors—you have only one thumb on each hand—and unchangeable. It 
is even, as discussed above, semipublic. This leads to the fear that a data breach or 
sale by one holder of a piece of a person’s biometric information would compromise 
the security of all relationships that are verified by that same piece. And, once 
compromised, the very nature of biometrics would make it impossible to regain 
security; biometrics are hard to alter. This is why the immutability of biometrics and 
concerns about identity theft appear so often in discussions of biometrics. As one 
scholar put it, “Essentially, biometrics are the equivalent of a PIN that is impossible 
to change. The theft of biometric information amounts to permanent identity theft, 
and thus may be extremely difficult to counteract.”102 
There is an entire literature now on the security of biometric systems, with 
teams of researchers regularly seeking to beat current biometric security and to 
design around known weaknesses.103 Notably, however, most of these studies do 
not begin with the assumption that biometric information has been stolen from one 
database and then is being used to hack another—the model that seemed to concern 
the sponsors of BIPA. Instead, these researchers often presume access to some 
trove of information, such as a user’s pictures on social media or a latent fingerprint, 
 
100. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(c). 
101. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, GETTING AHEAD: THE NEED TO ESTABLISH 
BASIC BIOMETRIC PROTECTIONS IN ILLINOIS (Submitted in support of S.B. 2400 May 28, 2008) (on 
file with author) (“The unique nature of biometrics . . . leaves a growing number of Illinoisans at 
heightened risk of financial loss/identity theft.”); see also Transcript of the State of Illinois 95th General 
Assembly House of Representatives 249 (May 30, 2008) (on file with author). 
102. Steven C. Bennett, Privacy Implications of Biometrics, PRAC. LAW. 13, 16–17 (2007). 
103. See, e.g., Kai Cao & Anil K. Jain, Hacking Mobile Phones Using 2D Printed Fingerprints, 
MSU TECHNICAL REPORT (Feb. 19, 2016), http://biometrics.cse.msu.edu/Publications/Fingerprint/ 
CaoJain_HackingMobilePhonesUsing2DPrintedFingerprint_MSU-CSE-16-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J26B-LJWA] (using printed images of fingerprints to access iPhones); Judith Myerson, How to Fool a 
Fingerprint Sensor, ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.electronicproducts.com/ 
Mobile/Devices/How_to_fool_a_fingerprint_sensor.aspx [https://perma.cc/TZ4R-X7T9] 
(discussing the strengths and weaknesses of different types of fingerprint scanners and their relative 
susceptibility to hackers); Corey Nachreiner, Passwords: 4 Biometric Tokens and How They Can Be 
Beaten, DARKREADING ( Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.darkreading.com/operations/passwords-4-
biometric-tokens-and-how-they-can-be-beaten/a/d-id/1330939 [https://perma.cc/P5U5-UC22] 
(reviewing a variety of biometric security possibilities and assessing their weaknesses); Lily Hay 
Newman, Hackers Trick Facial-Recognition Logins with Photos from Facebook (What Else?), WIRED 
(Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/08/hackers-trick-facial-recognition-logins-photos-
facebook-thanks-zuck/ [https://perma.cc/M5MX-V22X] (describing a project that tricked facial 
recognition technology using images of a user’s face taken from social media). 
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and then see whether enough information can be extracted from this source to beat 
a scanner. It is unclear whether BIPA meaningfully protects against this sort of 
attack. In one proof-of-concept study that is somewhat closer to the BIPA model, 
however, researchers were able to beat an iris scanner by reconstructing what the 
original iris must have looked like based on the stored data captured by a biometric 
scanner.104 
Though the legislative findings recorded in the text of the statute lead with 
concern over identity theft, there is also some mention of other issues. Specifically, 
the legislature pointed to popular fear over use of biometrics and the uncertainties 
inherent in this new technology.105 In the ten years since the statute was passed, the 
discussion of biometrics has shifted more to concerns over how biometrics can 
enable public tracking, specifically a fear that increased use of biometrics to monitor 
public spaces could lead to the death of anonymity. This rationale is in part what 
motivated Microsoft to call for greater regulation of facial recognition,106 and it was 
also stressed in an ACLU amicus brief filed with the Illinois Supreme Court in the 
recent Rosenbach case.107 Certain kinds of biometric data allow for the possibility of 
public tracking via security cameras, and the possibilities for future growth in this 
area are immense.108 A single image of a face at a public event could rapidly be 
identified by consulting one database and then linked to an endless stream of 
 
104.  Kim Zetter, Reverse-Engineered Irises Look So Real, They Fool Eye-Scanners, WIRED ( July 
25, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/07/reverse-engineering-iris-scans/ [https://perma.cc/
94D3-4DQN]. 
105. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(d–f). 
106. See Harwell, supra note 2. 
107. Brief of Amici Curiae the American Civil Liberties Union, The American Civil Liberties 
Union of Illinois, the Center for Democracy & Technology, the Chicago Alliance Against  
Sexual Exploitation, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Illinois PIRG Education Fund, Inc., and  
Lucy Parsons Labs in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 3, Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t  
Corp., No. 123196 (Ill. July 6, 2018), available at http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/SupremeCourt/ 
SpecialMatters/2016/123186_AMB.pdf [https://perma.cc/TE43-S8JG] (“Without reasonable limits, 
biometric technologies threaten to enable corporations and law enforcement to pervasively track 
people’s movements and activities in public and private spaces, and risk exposing people to forms of 
identity theft that are particularly hard to remedy.”). This case has now been decided. See supra note 17 
and accompanying text. 
108. See Bennett, supra note 102, at 17 (speculating that this could lead to the end of anonymity 
and the suppression of dissent); Blitz, supra note 46, at 1410–11 (discussing how public tracking via 
video surveillance would curtail First Amendment freedoms); Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating Real-
World Surveillance, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1113, 1126 (2015) (“Extensive surveillance can produce both 
conformity and anxiety. When the government wields public surveillance as a tool, this shifts the 
balance of power between citizens and government, and makes citizens less able to effect democratic 
change.”); Sharon Nakar & Dov Greenbaum, Now You See Me, Now You Still Do: Facial Recognition 
Technology and the Growing Lack of Privacy, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 88, 99 (2017) (“Soon, if not 
already, simply by walking past a store putative customers might be identified by camera, and be alerted 
about sales in the vicinity . . . . There are already billboards that engage with passing costumers by using 
simplistic facial-recognition software that can identify the costumer gender, age, and even their  
mood . . . . Stores and casinos also use this technology to prevent previously identified unwanted guests 
like card counters and shoplifters from entering.”).   
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personal information as that database is connected to others.109 This presents a 
substantial problem if one values the idea of public anonymity. And here the 
immutable nature of biometrics is indeed troubling; once your facial geometry is out 
there, it can be used to track you until your appearance drastically changes. In 
general, this public tracking concern is more applicable to facial geometry and 
perhaps voiceprints than to fingerprints, but it is difficult to predict where future 
technological advances may take us. For example, long range iris scans are now 
technologically feasible, meaning that many of the arguments about facial 
recognition tracking in public apply there as well.110 
A broader framing of this concern focuses on uncertainty about what 
biometrics might enable in the future. Biometric technology is fairly new, and new 
technologies can fundamentally change our understandings of privacy even in very 
short periods. The first iPhone was released in 2007. Only seven years later the 
Supreme Court held that smartphones are special for privacy purposes—they had 
become so integrated into our daily lives that to pretend they were simply oddly-
sized briefcases would have been absurd.111 And in 2018 the smartphone-driven 
legal revolution continued, with long-held assumptions about privacy interests in 
third-party held location data being overturned in the cell phone context.112 Right 
now, biometrics data is being collected by a host of apps and smart-home style 
devices.113 This type of data is generally not well-protected by current privacy law.114 
The downstream implications of this are, at best, unclear.  
A final set of concerns involves the uniquely personal nature of biometrics. A 
person’s face is part of them in a way that their social security number or identity 
card is not—no government or corporation issued them their biometrics. This is an 
argument that sounds in dignity more than practicality, but we should not be too 
quick to reject the notion that biometrics are more revealing than is immediately 
 
109. Bennett, supra note 102, at 17. 
110. Robinson Meyer, Long-Range Iris Scanning Is Here, ATLANTIC (May 13, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/05/long-range-iris-scanning-ishere/393065/ 
[https://perma.cc/JNK8-QPYK] (quoting the creator as saying, “Unlike other scanners, which 
required someone to step up to a machine, his scanner can capture someone’s iris and face as they walk 
by.”); see also Kien Nguyen et al., Long Range Iris Recognition: A Survey, 72 PATTERN RECOGNITION 
123, 139 (2017), available at https://www.cse.msu.edu/~rossarun/pubs/NguyenLongRange 
Iris_PR2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5E7D-HY4B]. 
111. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014) (“That is like saying a ride on horseback 
is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.”).  
112. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). 
113. Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of Things, 59  
B.C. L. REV. 423, 452 (2018). 
114. See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing 
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 95 (2014) (“Both state and federal 
consumer protection law has not yet addressed these problems or the general issues that the Internet 
of Things creates for consumer consent.”). 
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apparent. Recent research has suggested that it is possible to predict sexual 
orientation from facial geometry, for example.115  
Though discussions of BIPA’s purpose largely focused on data security rather 
than these other concerns, we should not assume the sponsors of BIPA were 
unaware of the possibility that future developments would raise other privacy issues. 
BIPA was very broadly written, and its strong focus on notice and consent serves 
an information-forcing function. Under BIPA, companies must give notice when 
they collect biometrics and of what they intend to do with them.116 Absent such 
legislative protection, the public would likely have a very poor idea of when and to 
what end biometric information is being used. BIPA forces biometric use out into 
the public, where it can be debated. BIPA also stated that its purpose was to make 
people feel safer when engaging in biometrically facilitated transactions by 
alleviating some of their privacy concerns, which arguably makes preventing 
consumer discomfort one of its central goals.117 
B. Empirical Data on Explanations and Justifications 
Immediately following the biometric scenarios presented in Part II, 
participants answered questions assessing their general level of comfort with 
biometric information collection by commercial entities. The questions were 
prefaced by a brief explanation of how biometric information could be used. 
Participants were told that a store might ask a customer to scan a fingerprint rather 
than swipe a card to access a customer rewards account or use facial recognition to 
suggest favorite orders. The full text of these prompts is included in the Appendix. 
Participants were then given separate explanations of fingerprint and facial 
recognition biometric procedures and asked to rate their level of comfort with a 
company having each if that company had the right to use the information however 
it wished. Comfort ratings were given on scales ranging from 1-6, with higher 
numbers indicating greater comfort.118 
 
115. See Derek Hawkins, Researchers Use Facial Recognition Tools to Predict Sexual Orientation. 
LGBT Groups Aren’t Happy, WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
morning-mix/wp/2017/09/12/researchers-use-facial-recognition-tools-to-predict-sexuality-lgbt-
groups-arent-happy/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.adb67e4e5ff7 [https://perma.cc/VFQ5-8UGJ]; 
Yilun Wang & Michal Kosinski, Deep Neural Networks Are More Accurate Than Humans at Detecting 
Sexual Orientation, OSF HOME (Feb. 15, 2017), https://osf.io/zn79k/ [https://perma.cc/FBU3-
PUNA].  
116. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15. 
117. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5. 
118. Participants who had seen the coffee shop vignette in the first part of the study reported 
that they were less comfortable with biometric data collection here. Since the coffee shop vignette is 
closest to this policy application, it seems that greater detail about this kind of program leads to even 
less comfort with it. The explanations selected by comfortable and uncomfortable participants did not 
vary as a function of prior biometric vignette, however. Tables available from the author. 
Here are the results for the two comfort measures. Fingerprint: F(2, 1223) = 5.59, p = .004, Ƨ2 = .009. 
Coffee (M = 2.12, SD = 1.57); Gym (M = 2.45, SD = 1.73); Employer (M = 2.48, SD = 1.74). Facial 
Recognition: F(2, 1223) = 5.65, p = .004, Ƨ2 = .009. Coffee (M = 2.17, SD = 1.56); Gym (M = 2.53, SD 
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Because the scale had an even number of points, and therefore no midpoint, 
it was possible to split respondents into those who reported being at least somewhat 
comfortable or at least somewhat uncomfortable with biometric collection. For 
both facial geometry information and fingerprint information, 74.6% of 
participants reported being at least somewhat uncomfortable. A pilot for this study 
conducted on Prime Panels—another provider that was tasked with providing a less 
representative set of respondents—found 73.4% discomfort for fingerprint 
information and 76.8% discomfort for facial geometry information, so this fairly 
extreme result has replicated. 
Each participant then received separate follow-up questions for fingerprint 
and facial geometry biometric information asking them why they were or were not 
comfortable, whichever was appropriate given their previous responses. 
Participants were able to select multiple reasons from a list and could also provide 
their own alternative explanation for their feelings. The list of potential reasons was 
generated from a review of the arguments made in discussions of biometric privacy 
and was supplemented by suggestions from research assistants. There were no large 
differences in the reasons selected for fingerprint and facial recognition 




= 1.73); Employer (M = 2.47, SD = 1.68). Differences between coffee shop and the other vignettes are 
significant at the p < .05 level. 
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Table 3: Reasons for Comfort or Discomfort with Biometric 
Information Collection. 
Note: Text in the survey substituted “facial geometry” and “fingerprint” as needed. The 
“Other” option always appeared last, but the other choices appeared in random order. 
 
A review of the reasons for discomfort suggests that concern about biometric 
data collection comes from many sources.119 Four different rationales were selected 
by at least half of the sample. The most commonly chosen rationale was that it felt 
very invasive for a company to collect and share the information (70% overall). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the prior discussion of facial recognition databases 
and the proliferation of cameras in public places, 67% said that they were worried 
where the collection of biometric information might lead in the future. Similarly, 
63% selected an option that specifically mentioned tracking in public when 
considering facial geometry information, though only 55% mentioned it for 
fingerprints. Finally, 55% said they were concerned that collection of this 
information could lead to identity theft. Interestingly, only a small minority cited 
two reasons that are frequently mentioned in the literature: that biometrics cannot 
be changed, and that biometric information is “part of me.”120 
 
119. See Table 3. 
120.     See e.g., supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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Only one reason for comfort attracted near majority support. For fingerprint 
data, 57% said that they had nothing to hide that fingerprint information would 
reveal. For facial geometry information, 50% said likewise. All other explanations 
attracted less than a third of the sample each. In a somewhat surprising turn, only 
28% said that facial geometry information was already public. 
These results are strongly supportive of a multi-factor approach to biometric 
privacy harms. Though participants are concerned about data security and identity 
theft—perhaps correctly, perhaps not—they are also, and in fact more, concerned 
about several other factors. And it is hard to dismiss these other concerns as 
products of ignorance because facial recognition can be used to track people in 
public, long range iris scanners in the tradition of Minority Report are 
technologically feasible, and we don’t know what other uses will become possible 
in the years ahead.121  
IV. WHAT USES MAKE PEOPLE UNCOMFORTABLE? 
The previous data shows that at least some uses of biometric technology 
concern people, and that a meaningful number of people are willing to incur costs 
to avoid having their biometric information collected and used. Biometric 
technology can be used in many different ways, however, and some of those ways 
seem less intuitively troubling than others. One can unlock the latest model iPhones 
using facial recognition, and the biometric data that enables this is stored only on 
your own device.122 For many, this might feel less intrusive than a store using facial 
recognition to track your shopping patterns even if both are uses of the same 
technology. 
When thinking about biometric technology policy, it is important to consider 
a wide range of possible uses. Should the law distinguish between a bank using your 
voiceprint to confirm your identity from a department store using your facial 
geometry to serve targeted advertisements? Is it a problem if a store initially collects 
biometric data for one purpose and then decides to use it for another without 
obtaining fresh consumer consent? 
To help answer these questions, a second study was conducted. This study 
drew its panel from Dynata, the successor company to Research Now/SSI. Again, 
the demographics of the sample were set to match U.S. census proportions on the 
dimensions of age, sex, region, education, and race/ethnicity. Full demographics are 
reported in the Appendix. The final sample contained 1029 individuals.123 
 
121. See supra notes 3–4, 104, and accompanying text. 
122. The Associated Press, How Does Apple’s Face ID Work and Will It Store My Face in the 
Cloud?, HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.thespec.com/news-story/7580403-
how-does-apple-s-face-id-work-and-will-it-store-my-face-in-the-cloud-/ [https://perma.cc/BEA5-
R3RA]. 
123. As with the first study, inattentive participants were screened from the final sample based 
on two criteria. First, participants who did not give the appropriate response to either of two attention 
check questions—questions asking participants to give a particular response—were unable to complete 
First to Printer_Kugler (Do Not Delete) 10/29/2019  1:34 PM 
2019] FROM IDENTIFICATION TO IDENTITY THEFT 139 
In the first study, the point had been to assess how people felt about biometric 
technologies when they were presented as part of a relatively rich vignette. Here, 
the purpose was to examine how people felt about different uses of biometrics 
compared to one another. Rather than presenting participants with lengthy stories, 
therefore, this study gave brief, one-sentence descriptions of business uses of 
biometrics. Participants were asked to rate how comfortable they were with these 
uses on scales ranging from 1 – Very Uncomfortable to 6 – Very Comfortable. The 
full text of the questions is given in the Appendix. The items were administered in 
quasi-random order.124 
As can be seen in Table 4, people were much more comfortable with some 
uses of biometric technology than others. In general, people seemed most 
comfortable when biometrics were being used for security purposes or in place of 
passwords. For instance, people were fairly comfortable with using either 
fingerprint (71.1% comfortable) or facial recognition (58.9%) biometrics to unlock 
a phone. They were also more comfortable than not with using biometrics to unlock 
an app (65.0% comfortable) or verify an identity when calling a credit card company 
(54.9%).  
People were much less comfortable, however, with the next generation of 
biometric uses. Using facial recognition to track people on public streets (68.1% 
uncomfortable), detect photos of celebrities online (73.8%), or to link profiles of 
people across social networking sites (69.1%) made majorities uncomfortable. 
Driving home this distinction, 58.9% of people were comfortable with a store 
using facial recognition to detect when people who were banned from the store, 
such as previously apprehended shoplifters, had entered. But only 25.8% were 
comfortable with the store using facial recognition to track customer interest for 
serving advertisements.125 The same actor, using the same technology, was 
evaluated quite differently depending on the goal of the use.  
 
 
the study. Second, participants were screened from the final sample if they finished the study in less 
than one-third of the time taken by the median participant. 
124. To reduce subject fatigue, the eighteen items were splits over three pages with six items to 
a page. A programming limitation prevented fully randomizing item presentation across these pages, 
however. Instead items were randomly assigned to one of three blocks (each being a page) and then 
both the order of block presentation and the order of questions within each block was separately 
randomized for each participant. Since doing this block randomization only once would have led to 
Item A always being in the same block as Item B—potentially giving rise to neighbor effects—three 
separate sets of block assignments were created. The end result is not perfectly random but is close. 
There were no significant differences in comfort ratings across block assignments (no p < .05 after 
correction for multiple comparisons). 
125. The wordings of these two items are below: 
A department store like Walmart or Home Depot using facial recognition to detect when people who 
have been banned from their stores—for example, people caught shoplifting—have entered. 
A department store like Walmart or Home Depot uses facial recognition to track where individual 
customers go in their stores and what items those customers look at, so they can later send those 
customers targeted advertisements. 
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Table 4: Comfort with Different Uses of Biometric Technology. 
Note: Means with standard deviations in parentheses. 
  
 Currently, biometrics laws do not sort between these kinds of uses. BIPA, for 
instance, has exemptions for banks and financial institutions,126 but it does not 
distinguish between a store using facial recognition to exclude known bad actors 
from one using biometrics to facilitate marketing. Second generation biometrics 
laws should begin to discriminate between these kinds of cases. According to these 
data, there is a world of difference between an employer taking a fingerprint for 
check-in and a homeowner’s association or technology company instituting public 
tracking via facial recognition. Perhaps it is reasonable to say that the employer need 
not get explicit consent for fingerprint check-in whereas the homeowner’s 
 
126. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/25(c). 
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association must for public tracking. Perhaps stores should operate under different 
restrictions depending on whether they use biometrics solely for security. Thus far, 
however, these distinctions do not matter doctrinally. 
These data also support the point made in Part III about fear of public 
tracking. The most discomforting uses of biometric technology all involve the use 
of facial recognition to follow people in public spaces. And, as the store questions 
make clear, people are deeply sensitive to the purpose of a tracking regime. This 
suggests that we should be very concerned about “purpose creep” in the biometric 
context. 
These data also support a notice-based regime. People care why data is being 
collected and how it is being used. For people to appropriately judge how they feel 
about an actor’s use of biometrics, however, they must know about it. If someone 
wants to boycott a store or bank because it uses biometric security, or specifically 
choose one because it does, then that is democracy at work. But people cannot have 
informed choice without notice.127 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
A. For the Value of Biometric Privacy 
Taken as a whole, these data show that many people value biometric privacy 
and that they take a broad view of possible biometric privacy harms. In each domain 
in the first study, people were significantly less comfortable with a check-in or 
tracking regime if the regime worked via biometrics rather than ID cards. This is a 
non-obvious result. One could defensibly argue that the main privacy or dignity 
violation is the tracking regime itself, that people don’t want to have to punch a 
time clock or have their every check-in at the gym or coffee shop permanently 
recorded. But these data show that there is an additional cost to comfort when these 
records are created via biometrics and biometric information is saved alongside the 
other data. 
One might express concern that participants are overly focused on the 
biometric elements of these scenarios. But the scenarios attempted to present the 
check-in and customer loyalty procedures in as straightforward and matter-of-fact 
a manner as possible. The main comfort questions do not even mention biometrics, 
simply referring to the check-in and data retention policies overall. The willingness-
to-pay questions, which did reference biometrics explicitly, appeared on a separate 
page, and the biometric policy questions that laid out biometric issues in more detail 
came after those on their own page. 
 
127. Kaminski, supra note 108, at 1136. (“Requiring notice allows the surveillance subject to 
recalculate her mechanisms for maintaining an optimized balance of openness and closedness in a given 
environment . . . . Notice can also trigger social enforcement through shaming of the person conducting 
surveillance.”). 
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Further, many participants report that they would be willing to pay to switch 
from a biometric regime to a non-biometric regime. Approximately a third of the 
participants in the employment case and over 40% in the gym case would be willing 
to pay some amount of money to switch from biometrics to ID cards. These data 
could be criticized as cheap talk because participants are neither being asked to 
spend their own money nor being presented with the kind of choice they regularly 
encounter. But the coffee shop loyalty program is much more naturalistic. 
Participants were told that the coffee shop’s loyalty program worked in a certain 
way and that, if they participated, they would get every tenth coffee free. If the 
program happened to work via ID cards, 77% wanted to participate. If it happened 
to work via biometrics, only 47% wanted to participate. For such a minor change, 
this was a substantial difference in uptake and was observed when considering the 
kind of choice that people might realistically face in their daily life. 
Providing assurances that data would only be kept for as long as it was needed 
and would not be used for other purposes meaningfully increased comfort in the 
employment case, and led to fewer people expressing willingness to pay to opt out 
there. This suggests that the BIPA requirements—which the “destroy” conditions 
were intended to mirror—actually do provide some reassurance to employees and 
consumers. And, since many current BIPA cases are employment related, these data 
may be particularly relevant to ongoing litigation. 
But the effect of these use and security limitations was less clear in the coffee 
and gym conditions, with the effect on comfort being weaker (and occasionally non-
significant) and the willingness-to-pay data being mixed. Likely, the social 
understandings of employment relationships differ from those of consumer 
relationships, and these different background assumptions play a role in these 
divergent effects. One possibility is that employees are already accustomed, by 
necessity, to trusting their employers not to misuse other kinds of sensitive 
information. Employers already know social security numbers, salary amounts, 
health insurance choices, and family status, for example. So, while employees may 
be primed in the employment context to extend further trust when biometric 
information requirements are coupled with confidentiality assurances, there is no 
similar model for gyms or coffee shops. The modal barista is likely trusted with your 
order preferences, the frequency of your visits, and whether you tip or are nice to 
them. Though these pieces of information are arguably also revealing, they are not 
of the same caliber. 
B. For Theories of Biometric Harm 
Returning to theories of biometric harm, these data show that people are 
taking a broad perspective. No single theory of harm dominates for people 
concerned with biometric data collection, and many participants are attributing their 
discomfort to multiple sources. Many say that biometric data collection and sharing 
feels invasive (dignity). But many also express concerns about public tracking and 
the future harms that may be enabled by biometric data usage (tracking in public) 
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and identity theft (security). This suggests that the data security focus that 
dominated early discussions of biometric privacy misses a meaningful portion of 
what now concerns people. Courts wanting to take biometric privacy seriously 
would do well to consider the multifaceted nature of biometric privacy concern and 
not shortchange either the dignity features of biometric privacy or the downstream 
consequences of biometric data collection. 
Further, the second study shows that not all uses of biometrics are the same. 
Some uses were concerning only to a small minority, but some made a strong 
majority uncomfortable. This simple insight suggests that the current litigation over 
Illinois’s biometric privacy statute has led some people astray. Courts are trying to 
decide whether it causes you harm when a company collects your biometric 
information if they do not disclose it.128 These data suggest that this is exactly the 
wrong question. Courts should instead be asking whether it causes you harm when 
a company collects your biometric information given what they do with it. Some uses 
may cause harm, and others may not. 
As we craft new biometric privacy laws, we should not argue about how 
sensitive this or that piece of biometric information is—that leads into the trap of 
asking whether your face is private. Instead, we should ask what kinds of activities 
we want to enable. It appears, based on these data, that there would be a majority 
in favor of using biometrics to make banking more secure. There is also a strong 
majority in favor of not using biometrics to track people in public for the purpose 
of marketing. There is much more work that can be done to flesh out these results—
among other things, one can ask whether “majority” is the appropriate standard—
but these data set a few guideposts that may serve to begin the discussion.  
C. For Standing Doctrine 
These results can inform the question of standing in federal courts. Numerous 
federal courts have been confronted with the question of when a violation of the 
notice and consent provisions of a biometric privacy statute gives rise to Article III 
standing.129 Standing requires that the plaintiff have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, 
(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is 
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”130 In the context of privacy 
class actions, the main issue in dispute is whether there is an “injury in fact,” which 
is why the construction of harm is so important. 
The Supreme Court has been less than clear about what counts as an injury 
for standing purposes. In the recent Spokeo case, for instance, the Court held that 
“[t]o establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an 
invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and 
 
128. See, e.g., McGinnis v. United States Cold Storage, Inc., No. 17 C 08054, 2019 WL 95154, 
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2019); see also supra note 20. 
129. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
130. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). 
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‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”131 The Court then clarified 
that “concreteness” and “particularity” are separate and distinct elements; a plaintiff 
must allege that his injury satisfies both for standing purposes.132  
In the context of this sort of privacy class action, particularization is not a 
major problem. A particular person’s biometric data is allegedly being improperly 
collected or disclosed, so that particular person suffers a particularized harm. The 
particularity question has historically been most challenging in the environmental 
domain, where some injurious action might affect an entire community, or the entire 
country. The seminal particularity standing cases, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife133 and 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,134 both concerned 
environmental regulations. According to the Court, the challenge in those sorts of 
cases is to limit the right to sue to only those who are uniquely affected.135  
Though particularity is not a major problem in the biometric privacy domain, 
concreteness is often a serious issue.136 The problem is that sometimes a legislature 
has granted an individual the ability to sue when some right is violated, but the 
courts are not sure whether the person has actually been hurt by the violation of 
that right.137 In his majority opinion in Spokeo, Justice Alito states that Congress 
cannot grant a person a right to sue if that person has not been harmed, so courts 
will not defer entirely to legislative judgement.138  
There is still some level of deference, however. Alito says the Court should 
find the conclusions of Congress instructive when considering whether a person 
has been harmed because Congress (or, presumably, a state legislature) is “well 
positioned to identify intangible harms.”139 He then quotes Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence from Lujan, “Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate 
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed 
before.”140 
 
131. Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
132. Id. at 1550 (analysis of the circuit court below was “incomplete” because it “failed to fully 
appreciate the distinction between concreteness and particularization”). For further discussion of this 
point, see, e.g., James E. Pfander, Standing, Litigable Interests, and Article III’s Case-or-Controversy 
Requirement, 65 UCLA L. REV. 170, 213–17 (2018) (discussing the Court’s concreteness and 
particularity requirements in Spokeo). 
133. 504 U.S. at 565–68. 
134. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000). 
135. See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL  
L. REV. 275, 279–89 (2008) (discussing the history of harms sufficient to confer standing).  
136. The way in which the concreteness requirement is applied in privacy cases arguably signals 
a meaningful shift in standing doctrine. Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 439, 439 (2017) (“Whereas older standing cases focused on whether the plaintiff before the 
court was the right plaintiff, the newer privacy-based cases are focused on, or making assumptions 
about, whether or not the harm caused by the defendant is the right kind of harm.”). 
137. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013) (describing the standard for 
probabilistic harm). 
138. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). 
139. Id. 
140. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) 
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This semi-deference to legislative judgments about harm leads Justice Alito 
into a distinction between a “bare procedural violation” and actual harm.141 When 
a legislature identifies actual harm, it can give a right to sue even though no right 
existed previously. But when the legislature establishes procedural rights, not every 
violation of those rights causes concrete harm.142 In the context of Fair Credit 
Reporting Act claims, for example, a consumer reporting agency may fail to follow 
procedural reporting requirements aimed at ensuring accuracy, a violation of the 
statute.143 If a plaintiff’s credit report nonetheless remains accurate, however, they 
cannot establish concrete harm despite the consumer reporting agency’s technical 
violation.144 Further, in Alito’s view, not even all inaccuracies in credit reports cause 
concrete harms.145 An incorrect zip code in a credit report, for example, does not, 
“without more,” “cause [concrete] harm or present any material risk of harm.”146  
This set of distinctions between substantive and procedural harms puts courts 
facing issues of privacy and data security in an awkward position, as it is not always 
clear 1) when a procedural requirement serves a (sufficiently) substantive purpose 
that its violation qualifies as a harm and 2) when the violation of a procedural 
protection presents a material risk of harm. Take Justice Alito’s example of an 
inconsequential inaccuracy: an incorrect zip code. Research has linked commute 
length to employee engagement and longevity, so employers sometimes consider 
commute length in hiring.147 This means that an incorrect zip code might indeed 
count against a job applicant; the prospective employer would misunderstand where 
they now live. Zip codes are also associated with the usual suite of demographic 
variables, including race and ethnicity, and zip code discrimination has been alleged 
 
141. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550. 
142. Id.  
143. Id.  
144. Id.  
145. Id. 
146. Id. Justice Thomas’s concurrence tracks a parallel but somewhat different course. In his 
world, a violation of a regulation that is intended for public good, such as one requiring a corporation 
to post a contact number on its website, does not give rise to standing to sue. However, violation of a 
private right, such as the right to have a consumer reporting agency follow “reasonable procedures to 
ensure maximum possible accuracy,” would create individual standing because it concerns the accuracy 
of particular reports and implicates a right that belongs to a particular individual. Id. at 1553–54 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
Since BIPA creates an individual right not to have one’s information collected absent certain formalities 
and safeguards, Thomas would likely have to find standing in many cases because rights created by 
BIPA are more “private” than “public.” 
147. See, e.g., Kazim Ladimeji, Should a Candidate’s Commute Time Be a Selection Factor?, 
RECRUITER (Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.recruiter.com/i/should-a-candidates-commute-time-be-a-
selection-factor/ [https://perma.cc/BEA5-R3RA]; see also John Sullivan, You Might Be Surprised  
How Much Commute Issues Hurt Hiring and Retention, DR. JOHN SULLIVAN, 
https://drjohnsullivan.com/articles/you-might-be-surprised-how-much-commute-issues-hurt-hiring-
and-retention/ [https://perma.cc/BU6S-KZGT] ( last visited Sept. 5, 2019). Zip codes are also 
associated with the usual suite of neighborhood variables such as race and ethnicity, which are related 
to hiring preferences as well. Id. 
First to Printer_Kugler (Do Not Delete) 10/29/2019  1:34 PM 
146 U.C. IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:107 
in a variety of contexts.148 It might be illegal to discriminate against someone 
because an error in their zip code led you to think they were the “wrong” race, but 
it may still happen. 
If reasonable minds can be mistaken about the importance of something as 
simple as an errant zip code, something as complicated as biometric privacy seems 
destined to be a muddle. The question of whether some data collection or use 
practice is a substantive violation, a procedural violation, or a “bare” procedural 
violation simply returns us to the initial problem of defining what counts as a 
“concrete” harm. 
To define “concrete” harm, let us consider concrete data. The results 
presented here show that people may have many different reasons for wanting to 
exercise control over how their biometric information is used. It is not enough that 
biometric data not be used to further identity theft; people are also concerned that 
this data is not mishandled in a variety of other ways. Many people would not, for 
instance, want to be tracked in public via their biometrics, and the mere collection 
of biometric information is enough to make some people meaningfully 
uncomfortable even without specific threats of downstream consequences. Recall 
the benefits that people were willing to give up, or costs that they were willing to 
accept, to not participate in biometric programs. If people say they would put 
money on the table to avoid a practice, then it seems odd to call that practice 
harmless. So, there is a wide range of potential substantive harms. 
The procedural protections of BIPA also serve substantive purposes. This was 
the rationale recently adopted by the Ninth Circuit in finding standing in the 
Facebook photo-tagging case.149 BIPA explicitly requires that the purpose of the 
data collection be disclosed and that the data subject agree to the collection in 
writing.150 This insistence on informed consent fundamentally creates a bargain—
“You can have my information if you do ____ with it and no more”—and the 
insistence on written consent creates a record of that bargain. One common problem 
in the privacy space is the discovery of new uses for old information.151 Would 
people care if biometric information that was collected for one purpose was being 
used for another? The data in Part IV show that they would. A store would likely 
 
148. See, e.g., NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, ZIP CODE INEQUALITY: 
DISCRIMINATION BY BANKS IN THE MAINTENANCE OF HOMES IN NEIGHBORHOODS OF COLOR 
(2014), https://nationalfairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2014-08-27_NFHA_REO_ 
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/78JT-8W4J]. 
149. Patel v. Facebook, Inc., No. 18-15982, 2019 WL 3727424, at *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2019) 
(“The plaintiffs allege that a violation of these requirements allows Facebook to create and use a face 
template and to retain this template for all time. Because the privacy right protected by BIPA is the 
right not to be subject to the collection and use of such biometric data, Facebook’s alleged violation of 
these statutory requirements would necessarily violate the plaintiffs’ substantive privacy interests.”). 
150. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2019). 
151. See, e.g., Ryan Dezember, Your Smartphone’s Location Data Is Worth Big Money to Wall 
Street, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/your-smartphones-location-
data-is-worth-big-money-to-wall-street-1541131260 [https://perma.cc/Y3L7-TTQQ] (discussing 
how cellphone location information can be used to assess industrial productivity). 
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have the support of a majority of its customers if it wished to use facial recognition 
to better exclude those who had previously been banned from it. The store would 
likely be condemned by a supermajority of its customers, however, if it used the 
same information and same analytic techniques to track customers for advertising 
purposes. It is likely in recognition of such distinctions that the home improvement 
store Lowes used to reassure its customers that it would not use facial recognition to 
track customer preferences in this way and would only use it for security.152 When 
there is a written contract it is much easier to establish what promises were made 
and implied in the moment of information collection. 
The hardest case for standing is one in which a company collects biometric 
information in a manner that is completely open and uses the information only for 
a purpose that is completely obvious to those whose biometric data it has captured. 
Think, for example, of the employee timekeeping cases, where employees know 
why they are turning over their fingerprints, and of the Take-Two litigation, where 
video game players knowingly allowed a camera to capture their images so that the 
game could incorporate them into personalized avatars.153  
One could argue the requirement of a writing serves a substantive purpose 
even in these cases. There are times when the law has recognized that apparently 
empty formalities serve a broader policy goal.154 In the law of gifts, for example, it 
is important that the gifts are actually delivered to recipients in some form rather 
than merely promised, however earnestly.155 The rationale behind this requirement 
is a concern with ensuring that the donor really means to give the gift.156 This 
pickiness about procedural niceties is also the primary justification for the Statute 
of Frauds and its requirement that certain contracts be in writing rather than oral.157  
A state would be in good company if it wishes to be similarly picky about the 
form in which consent is given. The European Union’s (EU) General Data 
Protection Regulation, for instance, has explicit guidelines that attempt to avoid the 
problem of unread boilerplate consent,158 and also requires that data collected for 
 
152. LOWE’S, supra note 34 (“We do not use facial recognition or other biometric identifiers for 
marketing purposes or to build profiles of shoppers.”). This policy is no longer in effect and has been 
replaced by one that does not offer the same guarantees. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
Lowes has declined the opportunity to comment on the change. Personal email from author, to 
Lowes.com Privacy Team (Aug. 14, 2018). 
153. Santana v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 717 F. App’x 12, 15 (2d Cir. 2017). 
154. See, e.g., Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,  
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 820–24 (1935).  
155. Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 155–56 (1989) (explaining that 
the delivery requirement exists to ensure that donative intent has been correctly ascertained). 
156. Id.  
157. U.C.C. Law § 2-201 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (contracts for sale of 
certain goods are unenforceable “unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for 
sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought”); 
see also Carolyn M. Edwards, The Statute of Frauds of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Doctrine of 
Estoppel, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 205, 207 (1978) (noting that the historical purpose of the Statute of Frauds 
was “to provide reliable evidence of the existence of a contract” and prevent fraudulent claims). 
158. General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. L199, art. 7. 
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one purpose not be retained and used for radically different purposes.159 It is hard 
to imagine that the EU would view “performative” consent as sufficient if a statute 
specifically called for written consent.  
This insistence on written consent also creates a series of important incentives 
for corporate actors. When your employer collects your fingerprints to increase the 
accuracy of its timekeeping, it likely has no intention of using the data for other 
purposes. It may not, however, have devoted any attention to data retention 
schedules, data use restrictions, and data sharing possibilities. If your employer is 
required to comply with the formalities of BIPA, then it will be forced to take all 
these topics seriously and evidence its seriousness by posting a public privacy policy. 
This substantially increases the real level of protection that you will enjoy. If your 
employer can avoid these procedural requirements until it commits a more 
substantive violation, however, then it will likely be meaningfully sloppier in its data 
handling practices.160 Importantly, merely not having a publicly posted policy would 
make it difficult for employees like yourself to detect just how sloppy it is being. 
We must therefore consider these forgone prophylactic benefits before declaring 
BIPA’s technicalities “bare” procedure. The Illinois Supreme Court itself took 
exactly this view, saying that failure of a company to adhere to BIPA’s “statutory 
procedures” makes an individual’s biometric privacy rights vanish “into thin air,” 
manifesting the “precise harm” the legislature sought to avoid.161 
If courts are not willing to stretch federal jurisdiction quite so far, they still 
need to find standing in a wide range of other cases. Recall the multiple reasons 
why people might be concerned about the collection and retention of their 
biometric data. Even if the collection does not raise a data security concern, it could 
raise a public tracking concern. Even if it does not raise a public tracking concern, 
it may be a dignity violation. Only the truly open collection and truly limited use of 
biometric data requires one to argue that the harm comes from the lack of a writing 
itself. 
The list of potential substantive violations is extensive. If people are unaware 
that their information is being collected, data collection violates their substantive 
right to not have their information collected without their consent. If their 
information is retained for longer than the law permits, is held in an unsecure 
manner, or is transferred to third parties without consent or for profit, substantive 
guarantees are also violated. If the information is being used in ways that are not 
readily apparent to users or that change after the information has been collected, 
that bait-and-switch too should count as a substantive violation. 
The current round of biometric privacy litigation has gone after low-hanging 
fruit. It is easy to write a complaint saying that Company A violated the procedural 
 
159. Id. at art. 5(1)(b). 
160. Based on anecdotal comments, it appears that one of the challenges of bringing a company 
into compliance with BIPA is figuring out how the company has been storing biometric information. 
Often this was not previously considered an important question.  
161. See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186 ¶ 34 ( Jan. 25, 2019). 
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requirements of biometric information collection. Often all plaintiffs’ counsel needs 
do is: 1) know that the biometric is being collected, and 2) confirm that the data 
subjects were not given a privacy policy. If there is no standing to pursue these 
claims, however, then companies will not be forced the make the disclosures of 
purpose and intent that are necessary for the efficient detection of use and 
dissemination violations. This absence of disclosure then sharply limits future 
privacy protection. 
CONCLUSION  
Overall, these data show that many people value biometric privacy, and that 
their concerns are not motivated by a single factor. It is therefore hard to say that a 
truly unauthorized collection of biometric information has not caused some harm; 
it would have to raise none of the issues that are being cited. Though legislatures 
and courts may wish to exclude from protection those individuals whose biometric 
data is being collected with their knowledge and is only being used in ways of which 
they are aware, this still leaves a broad array of potential privacy harms. The 
immutable nature of biometrics makes it easy to repurpose biometric information 
collected for one purpose for other uses, and these data also show that people are 
extremely sensitive to this kind of purpose drift. 
Given the breadth of ways in which biometrics can be used, it is easy to 
understand why so many people are concerned about so many possible harms. As 
has been noted so frequently of late in Fourth Amendment doctrine, we cannot 
ignore how “seismic shifts in digital technology” have challenged traditional 
understandings of privacy.162 This domain is only the latest in a long line that will 




162. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018). 
First to Printer_Kugler (Do Not Delete) 10/29/2019  1:34 PM 
150 U.C. IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:107 
APPENDIX  
Demographics of the sample 
Note: For age and political orientation, the numbers in parentheses represent 
standard deviations. Hispanic identity was assessed in a separate question. 
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Comfort with Fingerprint and Facial Recognition Biometrics.163 
Introductory text: Companies are increasingly collecting biometric information 
about their customers. The two types of information that companies most 
frequently collect are scans of facial geometry and fingerprints. Companies can use 
this information in a variety of ways. A store might use fingerprints to track 
participation in a discount program, with a customer scanning their finger rather 
than swiping a card. Or a coffee shop might use facial recognition to identify 
customers as they enter the shop to suggest favorite orders. 
 
For fingerprint biometrics, a computer measures the characteristics of a person’s 
fingertips and generates a numeric expression of each finger’s unique features.  
 
How comfortable are you with a company having a record of your fingerprints if 
they are free to share that information with whomever they want? 
Very Uncomfortable (1) – Very Comfortable (6) 
 
Facial geometry is somewhat like a fingerprint for the face. A computer measures 
the characteristics of a person’s face and generates of a numeric expression of its 
unique features. For example, it might note the distance between a person’s eyes or 
the width of their nose relative to their mouth. 
 
How comfortable are you with a company having a record of your facial geometry 
if they are free to share that information with whomever they want? 
Very Uncomfortable (1) – Very Comfortable (6) 
 
Biometric uses for second data collection. 
x A bank uses a customer’s fingerprint rather than a password to access 
the bank’s smartphone app. 
x A credit card company using a voiceprint to confirm the identity of 
a customer when they call about their account. 
x A “smart” doorbell that uses facial recognition to notify a 
homeowner when particular people approach their front door. 
x A package pickup company that allows you to use your fingerprint to 
unlock the locker containing your package. 
x A performance venue using facial recognition to search a crowd for 
known stalkers of a performer. 
x A smartphone using facial recognition rather than passcodes to 
unlock. 
 
163. To avoid redundancy the many versions of the main vignettes are not reprinted here. They 
are available from the author upon request. 
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x A smartphone using fingerprints rather than passcodes to unlock. 
x A department store like Walmart or Home Depot using facial 
recognition to detect when people who have been banned from their 
stores - for example, people caught shoplifting - have entered. 
x A department store . . . to track where individual customers go in 
their stores and what items those customers look at so they can later 
send those customers targeted advertisements. 
x A program that uses facial recognition to comb social media for 
photos of celebrities to track their online mentions and physical 
locations. 
x A people search company using facial recognition to link the profiles 
of people across different social media sites. 
x A technology company using facial recognition to identify unknown 
persons in uploaded photos. 
x A technology company using facial recognition to track people’s 
locations using publicly uploaded photos. 
x A homeowner’s association using facial recognition to track the 
movements of people on its streets and sidewalks. 
x A technology company using facial recognition to detect when 
photographs of its users are uploaded onto other companies’ 
websites. 
x An employer using fingerprint scans rather than timecards for people 
to check in at work. 
x A coffee shop using facial recognition rather than id cards to 
administer their customer loyalty program, with cameras identifying 
people as they approach the counter. 
x A gym having their members check-in using a fingerprint scan rather 
than an id card. 
 
